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Summary
The present thesis has the ambition to jointly study two of the most invasive phenomena
that shaped our economies over the last decades: financialization and the rise of information
technology. The latter is strictly connected with innovation and economic progress but also to
the pursuit of monopoly rents – as Schumpeter teaches, they are the main drivers of innovation –
and the former can further contribute in shaping market power through additional rents. It has
become clear that information technology advances have profoundly modeled nowadays econ-
omy, revolutionizing not only the way we work (new technologies entail higher productivities,
the pandemic has legitimized massive smart-working forcing the digital transition, algorithms
are new ”bosses” in the Gig Economy to cite some examples), but also the way we consume
(Big Data steal and address our consumption preferences, changing the nature of market power
and rising privacy concerns) and the way workers’ rights are reshaped (usually worsened, as in
the case of food delivery and logistic in general). Returns from IT developments enrich big cor-
porations operating in the IT sector, and their Surplus Wealth will be under analysis in the first
chapter. Innovation, moreover, cannot be considered separately from financialization: M&A
practices have been broadly studied, but in the last decades a new phenomenon has developed
and deals with the accumulation of financial assets. The shift from profits stemming from firms’
businesses to profits stemming from financial activities may have macroeconomic consequences
that are still to be properly assessed. A recent report of the OECD, Çelik, Demirtas, and
Isaksson (2020), provided some insights of the magnitude of this unfamiliar trend, which is ever
increasing and popped up by low quality bonds. The study also confirms that non-financial
companies have considerably engaged in bonds’ holding/trading activities since 2009. In the at-
tempt to provide some interesting insights on that, in the first chapter of this thesis, we present
an empirical analysis concerning the link between financialization and monopoly power in the
form of Surplus Wealth, (defined as the difference between wealth and capital – both tangible
and intangible – employed). The first part of the chapter provides additional empirical support
– at micro level – in favour of management shift towards shareholders’ value orientation rather
than growth. Increasing dividend payments and stock buybacks by influencing stock price ex-
pectations appear to be among the primary drivers of corporations’ Surplus Wealth – together
with R&D and advertising expenditure – especially for companies at the top of Surplus Wealth
distribution – what we call monopolists– while profits derived from financial activities show
some more robustness in results only in the 95th percentile of the Surplus Wealth distribution.
The panels have been constructed using WRDS Compustat database for the period 1970-2018
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and comprehend active and inactive US non-financial corporations.
The second part of the analysis, consists of investigating corporations’ investment behaviour
when financial assets enter the decision making process. The holding/trading of marketable
securities have no clear effect on capital investment: first, financial profits’ positive impact on
both physical capital and intangible capital investment appear to be at odds with existing liter-
ature, in particular with Orhangazi (2008); second, regressions’ outcomes suggest the existence
of a trade-off between current financial investment and current capital investment. Interest-
ingly, such trade-off with tangible capital investment disappears for monopolists operating in
the IT sector and turns positive concerning intangible capital investment. The stemming pic-
ture is of relevance for several reasons: firms detecting degrees of monopoly power are heavily
engaged in the financing activity through the purchasing (and selling) of marketable securities
and the accumulation of financial assets, which provides additional wealth. This fact should
raise some concerns about (i) regulation and financial fragility, since non-financial corporations
are partially acting as if they were financial firms (enjoying the non regulative framework)
and their un-regulated activity may fuel unstable scenarios (in a bull market, higher financial
profits may decrease the required margins of safety and enhance financial investments, both in
good projects and in more risky ones. If interest rates increase, then the system may suffer
from instability); (ii) competition, because financialization might have an important role in
strengthening monopoly power by accruing additional wealth.
The second chapter theoretically addresses macroeconomic issues such as GDP fluctuations
and employment over a business cycle when intangible capital investment are affected by in-
novation, and the potential rise of related wealth concentration mechanisms. The theoretical
model has been settled in a macroeconomic agent-based environment, in order to look into the
continuous interaction of these two main phenomena. If there exists a link between these two
sources of wealth (innovation rents and financial rents) is still an open question. Macroeco-
nomic agent-based models seemed the most suitable theoretical tool, given their flexibility in
shaping behavioural decision rules in contexts of uncertainty. Starting with the CATS model1,
the credit market has been implemented with a market for bonds, where firms with some liq-
uidity in excess can invest in both Government bonds and corporate bonds, issued by other
firms, whose internal funds are not enough to carry production. Consumption-good firms need
capital to be able to produce and capital takes the form of a firm level aggregator, in order to
enable the coexistence of different types of capital (intangibles are assumed to have intrinsic
advertising properties stemming from, for example, artificial intelligence). To introduce growth
in a Schumpeterian framework in the model, some features of the K+S model2 are introduced
and implemented. By assumption, in the second chapter, innovation can be only related to
intangible capital, whose quality impact on labor productivity. Results based on Monte Carlo
simulation, where heterogeneous agents interact with each other through search and match-
ing mechanisms, offer different insights. First, intangibles’ holding can create some liquidity
concentration in the hands of few consumption-good firms owning the most innovative capital
1Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini (2015)
2Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2010)
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and in the hands of capital-goods producers at the frontier; bonds’ holding however can con-
tribute to more prolonged periods of liquidity accumulation also when the firm is no more at
the frontier. Second, companies’ engagement in the purchase of corporate bonds does not seem
to be beneficial to technical progress and economic growth: almost all simulations display lower
wages and increasing (but stable) unemployment rates. However, the nature of the experiments
and the design of results yield to some considerations: (i) the negative effect on growth seems to
depend on low levels of liquidity devoted to financial investments, so that there is less supply of
credit than needed in the economy; (ii) increasing such fraction actually stimulates innovations
through the finance-growth nexus, eliminating excess demand of credit, but negatively impact
on bankruptcies, also increasing the share of Ponzi positions in the economy; (iii) a gap among
firms’ liquidity fraction to be invested in bonds bring us back to the negative scenario, because
of credit rationing from the one side and the emergence of a trade-off effect among financial
investments and capital investment on the other side.
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Chapter 1
Financialization and Monopoly Surplus
Wealth: An Empirical Study
1.1 Introduction
Over the past decades corporations have progressively increased their wealth, meanwhile
going through a slowdown process of (tangible) capital accumulation. At the same time, the
level of intangible capital has risen. At macro level those trends can explain income inequality,
while at micro level they may shed some more light on market power and monopolistic compe-
tition. In a recent paper, Kurz (2017) addresses this issue of “additional wealth” consistently
held by monopolistic companies through the lens of information technology (IT) proposing a
linkage between monopoly rent (what he calls Monopoly Surplus Wealth) and IT driven busi-
nesses. Same sweet old question – i.e. “how much capital does [a firm] employ” and “how much
wealth does it create for its owners” –1, new answer: IT can generate monopoly rent, which
shapes income distribution, contributing to the fall in the profit share and income share mean-
while fuelling the share of monopoly surplus income. Also J. Stiglitz, in his latest book People,
Power and Profits addresses the new challenges brought about by IT and financial markets in
our age, signed by the pursuit of market power, not captured by standard competitive models.
He reports some quotes of the american magnate, Warren Buffet, who said: “The single most
important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power. If you’ve got the power to raise
prices without loosing business to a competitor, you’ve got a very good business”2 and again
“[We] think in terms of that moat and the ability to keep its width and its impossibility of
being crossed. We tell our managers we want the moat widened every year”3. We argue that
the moat can be thought as being a collection of rents coming from (i) the pursuit of innova-
tion (mostly related to IT) and (ii) financialization mechanisms4. The issue in properly dealing
1Kurz (2017), page 2.
2Interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, May 26, 2010. Reported in Stiglitz (2019), Ch.3,
page 48
3See Dayen, ”America’s favourite monopolist”. Reported by Stiglitz (2019), Ch.3, page 48
4A backward step: the word financialization is used to shape a phenomenon which took roots at the turn of
the ’70s-’80s in US and UK and whose boundaries and effects are still elusive, leaving the term itself orphan of
a proper and complete definition. Broadly speaking, Epstein (2005) describes it as being “the increasing role of
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with the latter phenomenon was (and still is) related to the difficulty in measuring it and brings
about many methodological problems on how to evaluate evidence both at micro and macro
levels. From the very beginning, however, financialization has been traced back to changes in
firms’ corporate governance structure, more and more influenced by shareholder activism which
eventually brought firms to shareholder value orientation5). This preference channel, entails
the fact that managers had progressively abandoned preferences for growth – and hence for
long-term investment projects identified with capital expenditure – in favour of preferences for
profits – and therefore for short-term (financial) investment and value creation mechanisms –
aligning their interests with those of shareholders, who are concerned with higher dividends and
increasing prices of the shares. Such an alignment has come also through changes in the wage
structure that allowed for more variable components in the form of stock options (which push
managers’ attention towards stock price movements) and through the offering of junk bonds,
which favoured the wave of hostile take-overs. To the best of our knowledge, most of the empir-
ical studies on financialization, are done in a macroeconomic framework and a relevant part of
the literature has found evidence of a negative impact on physical capital accumulation through
increased management preference for short-termism (shareholders value orientation) on the one
side and increased profits without (physical capital) investments which shape internal means of
finance on the other side6. The challenge is now understanding if the accumulation of intangible
capital suffers from financialization as well and, in particular, what is monopolists’ behaviour.
Our work suggests that financialization affects the Surplus Wealth measure and both tangible
capital expenditure and intangible capital expenditure in the aggregate, whilst negative effects
of financial assets almost vanish if we consider only monopolists. Further firms belonging to the
95th percentile of Surplus Wealth distribution and operating in the IT sector seem to benefit
from financial investment in their R&D and advertising expenditure.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 explicates the key concepts and the research
questions, providing also the motivation behind them and revising the existing literature; Sec-
tion 1.3 gives detailed information on the datasets’ construction as well as their most interesting
composition characteristics; Section 1.4 shows some empirical facts replicated by our datasets;
Section 1.5 then goes through the first empirical analysis, which aims at understanding whether
finanicalization variables are among the determinants of Surplus Wealth; Section 1.6 presents
results for GMM regressions on investment, both in physical capital and in intangible capital.
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic
and international economies” but the first attempts to address it can be traced back to the ’90s, when Arrighi
(1994) observes how increases in profits could not be only the result of firms’ production activity, but also of
the activity on financial markets.
5(see Davis and Thompson (1994), Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) Fligstein (2002)
6See Stockhammer (2005), Hein and Van Treeck (2010) for a comprehensive discussion
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1.2 Monopoly Surplus Wealth, Financialization, Invest-
ment and Related Literature
Pricing power still represents a challenging issue to economists: unobserved produced quan-
tities make mark-ups’ computation critical to be addressed empirically. Recently, a stream
of academic papers tried to estimate and quantify mark-ups basically relying on Olley and
Pakes (1992) and intuitions and estimation procedures (see De Loecker and Warzynski (2012),
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018), De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2020a), De Loecker, Eeck-
hout, and Mongey (2021)). Their estimated mark-ups are different from paper to paper, but
give an overall picture of the trend in the US: mark-ups are increasing (on aggregate) from 1980
onward, with a rest (either a downfall either a zero growth trend) in the 2000-2010 decade and
a recovery right after. The main drawback of this method concerns the use of a proxy for unob-
servable quantities produced in estimating the elasticity of output: individual firms’ revenues
are indeed deflated by a macroeconomic price indicator by sector (using NAICS 2 digits)7. Pre-
vious attempts to study market power and market concentration are related to the Tobin’s q:
Salinger (1984), for example, examines the long-run monopoly power by means of the Tobin’s
q measure; Gutiérrez and Philippon (2016) find out that high levels of Tobin’s q did not drive
capital investment, whose lack is, instead, justified by stock repurchase internal policies and
decreased competition. About investment, Grullon, Hund, and Weston (2014) investigate the
high investment-cash flow sensitivity of the top US capital spenders publicly traded firms argu-
ing that the Tobin’s q is a less accurate measure to capture such a sensitivity than current cash
flow; while Peters and Taylor (2017) restores the investment-q relation by including intangibles
in the definition of investment. In our attempt to investigate market power, we adopt a different
approach by exploiting Kurz’s measure of Surplus Wealth8: a considerable Surplus Wealth may
be representative of monopolistic power, whose moat consists of barriers to entry due to IT and
financialization, which enhance market value at the expense of capital investment. Information
technology and innovations in the field of (Big) data collection and their use to expand business
may represent a source of monopolistic rent that does not necessarily translate into excessively
higher mark-ups but that can consistently increase firms’ value (entailed in Surplus Wealth),
making standard theory on monopolistic competition not sufficient to explain nowadays mar-
ket power. Further, post-keynesians’ key insight claims that the slowdown of (physical) capital
accumulation has been driven by a shift in managerial targets from the pursue of long-term
firm growth (capital investment) to short-term shareholders’ value creation (again, what grows
is Surplus Wealth). Given that managers – those who run the company – can be shareholders
themselves, indeed, this objective alignment (value rather than growth) is easy to see. Basically,
with managers’ alignment to shareholders interests, the growth-profit trade-off lessens, being
both agents – the owners and those who carry the company – engaged in enhancing profits,
7We attempt to estimate mark-ups following the mentioned procedures and results will be provided in Section
C.3 of the Appendix.
8As will be later discussed, the measure of Surplus Wealth here employed, partially differs from the original
one in Kurz (2017).
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rather than growth. Stock-based compensation has been a tool through which such an align-
ment has been favoured; managers prefer short-term investments over long-term projects and
physical capital accumulation (which in post-keynesian tradition is the company’s driving force
for long-term growth) looses importance. According to this view, “retain and invest” went past
“downsize and distribute” internal policies, as claimed by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000). We
need to check whether this is true also for intangible capital accumulation, which has been left
out of the analysis so far. For example, Stockhammer (2008) relates some stylized facts with
arguments on the finance-dominated accumulation regime9, arguing that growth is affected by
a collection of financial developments such as financial markets deregulation and liberalization
of capital flows, increased financial markets’ instability, management and corporate governance
orientation towards shareholders interests and the invasion of different financial instruments,
which affected firms’ investment decisions and the increased access to credit related, for exam-
ple to mortgages and properties used as collateral which shaped the behaviour of households, to
cite some. Focusing on investment, he shows that, with some countries’ exceptions, (tangible)
capital investment as a percentage of operating surplus decreased in EU and US, ascribing this
trend to the increasing importance of shareholders and claiming that, indeed, from a keyne-
sian perspective, investment are mainly determined by future profit expectations rather than
past realized profits. Van Treeck (2008b) uses a stock-flow consistent macroeconomic model
to simulate the growing importance of shareholders’ value orientation, also in the form of re-
duced equity issuance to finance production (in the form of physical investments). Results,
however, are not clear-cut and strongly depend on different investment parameters’ values. In
this model, rentiers are fully associated with households: but if we are willing to assume that
financialization – at least partly – shapes firms’ activity and processes we have to take into
account that companies act both as capitalists and as rentiers. Stockhammer (2004) recognises
such duality but fails to address it in a satisfactory way. Contributions in the financialization
literature also include Davis and Stout (1992), who proposed a pioneering study on the 1980’s
takeover wave focusing the attention on the change in managers’ behaviour and Schaberg et al.
(1999), who noted how the emergence of new financial instruments or tendencies (e.g. stock
buyback) in UK did not necessarily impact on physical investment but on the market value of
non-financial corporations. Krippner (2005) in addressing the financialization phenomenon in
the US, defines the term “financial” as those “activities relating to the provision (or transfer) of
liquid capital in expectation of future interest, dividends or capital gains”10. Her purpose is to
understand economic change through what she calls an “accumulation-centred view” (i.e. by
analysing the profit generation process). She shows that for both the financial and non-financial
sector there has been an increase in income generated through financial activities with respect
to that generated by the productive activity in the aggregate, over the period 1950-2001. For
NFCs, the trend seems to be driven by manufacturing firms, which, in order to face negative
cyclical events affecting profitability, rely on financial activities to compensate lower profits
9From a macroeconomic point of view, this expression wants to highlight the driving force of financialization
in shaping the standard Keynesian expenditure function - i.e. aggregate demand, Y = C + I +NX +G
10Krippner (2005), Socio-Economic Review, page 174
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coming from the productive activity. Finally Dünhaupt (2012) focuses on the fall in labor in-
come share in US and Germany and tests its relationship with financialization econometrically.
This paper has the merit to have made an attempt in finding the link between financialization
and monopoly power11, where the former shows off in the form of dividend payments and share
buybacks, “downsize and distribute strategies”, M&A, interest rates’ variations or increasing
indebtedness. Prior studies on dividend payments and mark-up can be found in Hein (2009)
and Hein and Van Treeck (2010). Results are not clear-cut: wage income share is the only one
that goes below its initial level (in 1970); retained earnings as a share of net national income
remains quite constant, slightly increasing and rentier income share increases from the ’80s to
the end of the ’90s but then decreases, not supporting the financialization hypothesis. However,
the main force that drives rentier income share seems to be dividend income12, providing some
more support to the shareholder value orientation view. To our knowledge, there is just one
paper on the effects of financialization at micro level: Orhangazi (2008) tries to empirically
study how financialization affects investment in physical capital through two main channels:
increasing payments to financial markets and profits stemming from financial investments. His
main results tell us that (i) the first channel (financial payments) has a negative effect on in-
vestment in particular for large companies; (ii) the second channel (financial profits) decreases
investment in capital stock for large companies but positively affects physical investment for
small firms. Production is thus affected by corporations’ investment in financial assets. Talking
about investments also implies talking about risk and expectations. As Keynes put it: “two
types of risk affect the volume of investment which have not commonly been distinguished, but
which it is important to distinguish. The first is the entrepreneur’s or borrower’s risk and
arises out of doubts in his own minds to the probability of his actually earning the prospective
yield for which he hopes. If a man is venturing his own money, this is the only risk which is
relevant. but where a system of borrowing and lending exists, by which I mean the granting of
loans with a margin of real or personal security, a second type of risk is relevant which we may
call the lender’s risk.”13 Minsky’s theory of investment captures exactly this idea: in his book,
Stabilizing an Unstable Economy14 he tries to theorize how the demand price for capital (i.e.
the market price of existing capital assets15) lowers as the borrowers’ risk increases and how its
intersection with the supply price of new capital16 (or price of investment goods), increasing
with the lenders’ risk, determines investment and the required level of external financing, given
a certain level of internal funds. An increasing borrowers’ risk reflects a higher failure exposure
(i.e. a reduced borrowing power and a higher burden of debt over assets). A reduced borrowing
power is translated into an increase in required Margins of Safety (MoS). Investment decisions
crucially depend on expected cash flows generated (internal funds) and on expected flows of
11The determinants of the mark-up are here taken from Kalecki (1954): the degree of competition in the
goods market, the development of overhead costs and the bargaining power of labor unions
12As compared to (i) interest income, (ii) property income attributed to insurance holders and (iii) rents, the
other components of rentier income
13Keynes (1937), chapter 11.
14Minsky et al. (1986)
15Assenza, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, et al. (2010) assume it coincides with the stock price
16Assenza, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, et al. (2010) assumes it to be equal to the average price level
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external financing. Each firm recurring to external finance to fund tangible or intangible capital
investment is then a borrower. Each firm engaging in lending activities through the acquiring
of financial assets, is also a lender and this last remark has already captured the attention of
some academics as, for example, Villani (2021), Saibene (2019), Dao and Maggi (2018), Cesa-
roni, De Bonis, and Infante (2017) and Brufman, Martinez, and Artica (2013). Clearly, since
expected flows are in place, a crucial role is played by uncertainty. When a non-financial com-
pany buys other companies’ (or government) bonds or shares – which further directly broaden
Surplus Wealth – future internal funds are expected to increase and this shift incorporates the
lender’s risk, which has been considered to affect only external funds so far. An element of risk,
therefore, enters into funds available for future investment and financial networks arise also
among non-banking companies, potentially enhancing the risk of financial fragility17. Financial
fragility may appear exactly because, by lowering the required MoS, firms increasingly seek
financial investment to generate additional future internal funds. Fragile schemes might be
just around the corner: if an increasing number of borrowers is subject to indebtedness burden
(higher overall debt over total assets or higher interest payments) a break may occur and the
erosion of MoS among lenders cannot face the erosion of profits (due to borrowers’ inability
to face increasing financial commitments). The same issue can be re-shaped in neoclassical
terms. Take Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990): investment at equilibrium is determined by
the marginal productivity of capital (downward sloping) and the cost of funds, which is flat
to the volume of internal fund and then increases according to the interest rate on debt (that
incorporates risk). The “flat rate”, is therefore associated with a risk-free rate. But when
corporations chase additional internal funds through financial investments, we can no more
consider the cost of internal funding as the opportunity cost of holding a safe asset. Redundant
assets – i.e. marketable securities – entail lender’s risk and internal fund is hence dependent
on that. Duchin, Gilbert, Harford, and Hrdlicka (2017) have examined the composition of
financial assets’ portfolios, reporting the high percentage of risky assets. Assessing whether
financial investment have an effect on tangible and/or intangible capital investment decisions,
thus helps understanding whether firms have exposed each other to a new source of financial
fragility and whether this additional risk is necessary for carrying the operating activity or
to enhances monopoly rent. The main concern at macro level, which also corresponds to the
motivation behind this chapter, is related to the financial stability of the entire system (left for
future research). The collateral concern regards, instead, competition and market power and
is the object of this study.
1.2.1 Surplus Wealth as Measure of Monopoly Power
The starting point for the current empirical study stems from the observation according to
which “Monopoly Rent is capitalized by the market into Monopoly Surplus Wealth, which is the
17A higher Surplus Wealth is achievable – also – through higher financial investments, driven by lower required
margins of safety. Lower margins of safety may enhance exposition to risk, fuelling a bull market: expectations of
higher stock prices lowers the required MoS, which will favour investments (in general, not necessarily financial),
but such a speculation goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
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difference between Capital and Wealth”18. In the present chapter, we slightly depart from this
original formulation by including intangible capital in the definition of Capital Employed. The
issue of intangibles has been greatly debated: some are keen on considering it as part of capital,
others are more prone to keep it apart from capital (see Hall (2001), Hansen, Heaton, and Li
(2005), Hulten and Hao (2008), McGrattan (2017)). The argument is definitely controversial:
to cite an example, internal developed patents can be considered as a form of capital that will
be used in production, but at the same time they can be detected or sold in the form of licenses
in order to limit competition. The latter use of intangibles, is therefore more related to wealth
creation. However, let us assume that intangibles are a factor of production and that their
non-competitive features are captured by Surplus Wealth, which is initially formally defined as
in equation (1):
SurplusWealth = TotalWealth− Capital (1.1)
and whose accounting equivalent is represented by equation (2)19:
SurplusWealth = ExcessMarketV alue+RedundantAssets (1.2)
where RedundantAssets comprehend financial assets, which therefore suggests the existence of
a possible relationship between Surplus Wealth and financialization, inherent in listed compa-
nies’ wealth. The question is then: why should a firm cumulate financial assets? The primary
reason one can think of, is that financial investments can turn back additional revenues in
the form of interests, dividends and capital gains. Financial investments themselves do not
contribute directly to production (like investments in fixed capital or R&D) but the additional
revenues they generate may partly be used as internal funds for growth purposes tomorrow:
by expanding their internal funds through financial revenues companies are introducing an ele-
ment of risk in their investment function and if financial fragility arises in the system, companies
holding financial assets may be touched by instability and their internal funds could suffer. To
cite some examples about the scale of the phenomenon, in 2017 Apple’s asset side in the balance
sheet was composed by 66% of financial assets (they were 3% in 1995 and grew dramatically up
to 41% in 2005); Microsoft held 54% of assets in financial assets and Facebook 40%. Duchin,
Gilbert, Harford, and Hrdlicka (2017) found out that companies’ “cash and cash equivalents”
measure is composed, on average by 23,2% of risky assets, which raise to 38,3% when consider-
ing aggregate financial asset portfolios (where corporate debt and equity account for the 23,6%
and 8,6% respectively). Short-term investments (the “cash equivalents” component of the cited
measure), therefore, include a consistent percentage of risky securities and among them, 79%
are, in reality, illiquid (not properly a cash equivalent). So, by holding more financial assets,
companies can increase their wealth but at the expenses of internal funds’ exposure to risk. A
second observation – which will be developed in this chapter – pertains the strategic linkage
18Kurz (2017), page 1.
19To give some insights on the logic behind the two equations, please note that ExcessMarketV alue =
MarketV alue − NetWorth and Capital = TotalAssets − RedundantAssets. For complete details about
accounting manipulations, please refer to Kurz (2017), page 4.
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between financial profits and capital accumulation: given the slowdown in tangible capital ac-
cumulation, and the increase in intangible capital accumulation, we can assume that market
power lies in the latter form of capital and therefore that some proceeds from financial in-
vestments, by lessening the financing constraint, may be devoted to more strategic operations
such as M&A, R&D expenditure, advertising or branding expenditure, buy licenses, face patent
infringements etc. This does not mean that higher internal funds necessarily translates into
substantially greater R&D investment (and hence further drastic innovation and growth) for
monopolists: it only suggests that they might employ those additional profits in a sufficient
amount to maintain their market position through intangibles and related monopoly rents (and
not massively to pursue growth), since we assume the inverted U relationship between market
power and R&D to hold (see Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005)).
A second reason of holding financial assets relates to the fact that a fraction of financial
profits might, instead, be re-invested in other securities – thus favouring further financial capital
accumulation – and/or can be devoted to other strategic operations that enhance the market
value of a company (i.e. the payment of dividends to shareholders or the repurchase of shares to
make some examples) and hence monopoly Surplus Wealth in case of firms with market power.
In general, this might be done at the expense of growth: companies might face a trade-off in
deciding how much to invest in capital (whether tangible or intangible) and how much to invest
in financial assets and we expect this trade-off (if any) to be more relevant for competitive firms
rather than for monopolists. One last observation: holding consistent financial assets (and thus
making massive investments in marketable securities, whether short-term or long-term) also
means that the corporation basically partially operates as a bank, giving other companies the
liquidity they need to carry their business projects (remember that corporate debts represent
the 23% of risky financial asset portfolios according to Duchin, Gilbert, Harford, and Hrdlicka
(2017)) and it should rise some regulations’ concerns.
Until now we have explicited the endogenous but indirect effect of financialization on Surplus
Wealth (i.e. proceeds coming from financial investments that serve also for value purposes,
rather than only growth purposes). The direct effect of financialization on Surplus Wealth,
however, passes directly through its Excess Market Value component taking the explicit form
of shareholders’ value orientation previously introduced and that will be addressed in detail
in Section 1.5. The concerns regarding the measure of Surplus Wealth can be deducible from
Figure 1.1, that shows the distribution of Surplus Wealth among US non-financial companies
in 2018. The picture is striking in highlighting the great detention of Surplus Wealth “in the
hands” of few firms: the 99th percentile is occupied by only 20 listed companies (reported in
Table 1.1). This feature suggests that inference that does not take into account such differences
in the distribution on Surplus Wealth (i.e. using the representative firm) may also not take into
account the different investing and financing behaviour of corporations, which will eventually
shape aggregate investment and, potentially, financial fragility. This observation is the rationale
for the construction of three different samples to carry the empirical analysis (as explained in
details in section 1.3) and will allow for a departure from perfect competition in light of the
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assumption that monopolistic firms can behave differently.
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Surplus Wealth in 2018. Author’s calculations on WRDS Compustat
data.
Table 1.1: List of firms belonging to the 99th Percentile of wealthiest companies in 2018 ranked
according to their Surplus Wealth, from the highest value to the lowest one, and their IT classi-
fication.
Company Name Surplus Wealth IT status
APPLE INC 1101798.00 IT
MICROSOFT CORP 746264.88 IT
AMAZON.COM INC 671142.38 IT
ALPHABET INC 677356.50 IT
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 254280.80 partially IT
HOME DEPOT INC 195578.78 non-IT
COCA-COLA CO 194305.63 non-IT
PFIZER INC 173226.36 partially IT
CISCO SYSTEMS 173017.38 IT
NESTLE SA/AG 172108.63 non-IT
ROCHE HOLDING AG 170898.17 partially IT
BOEING CO 163060.20 partially IT
MERCK & CO 161826.06 partially IT
WALMART INCO 150814.22 non-IT
ORACLE CORP 142434.23 IT
MCDONALD’S CORP 136889.73 non-IT
PEPSICO INC 129770.60 non-IT
INTEL CORP 129030.94 IT
TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MFG CO 127823.73 IT
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 126932.47 non-IT
In what follows we try to address two main research questions:
1. What are the determinants of Surplus Wealth? In particular, does financialization directly
contribute to the creation and detection of firms’ market power?
2. How is investment behaviour affected by financialization and the accumulation of financial
assets? Is there a trade-off effect between financial investment (in particular, short-term
financial investment, which are possibly motivated by speculative reasons, given their
risky composition and their short-termism) and investment in tangible and/or intangible
capital? Most importantly, is there a liaison between financial rents and monopoly rents?
14
1.3 Data
The entire sample has been crated using WRDS Compustat annual, database for the fiscal
period 1970-2018. The analysis is focused on US active and inactive non-financial companies
(hence, SIC codes 6000-6799 are excluded as well as SIC codes from 9100 and SIC codes 4800-
4999) and comprehends those firms (i) with available global company key and fiscal year; (ii)
with non-negative values for total assets, total liabilities, sales and cost of good sold, capital
expenditure, R&D expenditure, advertising expenditure, dividend payments and issuance of
new shares/bonds and (iii) whose market value can be calculated20. Missing values have been
replaced by zeros and companies with less than 10 consecutive years of observations have not
been considered. Entry and exit over the time span considered led to unbalanced panels. The
list of variables is reported below, while summary statistics can be found in section A.1 of the
Appendix:
- Surplus Wealth (SWi,t): can be either calculated using eq.( 1.1) or eq.( 1.2), since both
yield the same outcome. Following Kurz (2017), in the calculation of Total Wealth and
Excess Market V alue, we have multiplied firms’ total assets by the ratio of (aggregate)
current-to-historical total assets values reported in Table B.103 of Z.1 (Financial Accounts
of the United States) available at Federalreserve.gov, to purge total assets from land value
(already embodied in equity prices)21.
- Sales, (SALESi,t): corresponds to the Compustat item sale and, apart from giving
information on firms’ turnover, can also be considered as a proxy for size.
- Leverage, (LEVi,t): is simply calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets.
- Tobin′s Q, (TobinQi,t): in the form of market value plus total liabilities (book value) over
total assets (book value), as in Brufman, Martinez, and Artica (2013) and Villani (2021).
- Labor productivity (Lprodi,t): we tried to calculate labor productivity at firm level by
using deflated total production (as the sum of sales and inventories – both finished goods
and work in progress) as a proxy for quantities produced22 and dividing it by the number of
employees reported on Compustat. Given that the deflator is a macroeconomic indicator
(more in detail, we have used the chain-type price indexes for value added by industry –
using NAICS codes – provided by BEA), this measure of labor productivity is very rough
and is used as a proxy with reserve.
- Acquisitions (ACQi,t): dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a strictly
positive value corresponding to the observation provided by Compustat item aqc in any
given year and zero otherwise.
20Market Value on WRDS Compustat is available, but only from 1998. There are some discrepancies among
the Market Value item values – mkvalt – and those computed by multiplying the number of outstanding shares
– csho – by the closing price, fiscal – prcc f, and therefore I have corrected those discrepancies using computed
data in order to ensure consistency with data before 1998.
21See Kurz (2017) for a detailed explanation of the rationale behind such adjustment
22We will discuss more on the use of deflated sales as a proxy for quantities in section C.3 of the Appendix.
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- Dividend payments (DIVi,t): Compustat item dv.
- Repurchase of own stocks (BUY BACKi,t): Compustat item prstkc.
- Market financing (MKT FINANCEi,t): is the sum of newly issued stocks (Compustat
item sstk) and newly issued bonds (Compustat item dltis) and represents the amount of
external finance that a firm ask to the market.
- Financial profits (πfini,t ): are interests and dividends income, Compustat item idit.
- Investment in tangible capital (Iκi,t): is capital expenditure in its usual sense, Compustat
item capx.
- Investment in intangible capital (I intani,t ): is the sum of R&D expenditure (Compustat
item xrd) and advertising expenses (Compustat item xad), and is here used as a proxy
for intangible expenditure.
- Long − term debt (DEBTi,t): Compustat item dltt.
- Financial payments (PAY fini,t ): is a proxy for cash commitments to financial markets
plus stock repurchase and can be obtained by summing dividends paid plus interest and
related expense (Compustat item xint) and stock buybacks.
- Redundant assets (REDi,t): corresponds exactly to financial assets, which is calculated
by summing Investment and Advances (Compustat items ivaeq and ivao) and Short Term
Investment (Compustat item ivst). It is a stock measure.
- Short−term fianncial investment (s.t. Ifini,t ): only corresponds to Compustat item ivst,
which is also the cash equivalent component of Cash and Cash Equivalents.
- IT belonging (χi): is time invariant and can take only 3 values. This step required
associating each sector to the level of IT business of the sector/industry using GICS codes.
The procedure to do so consisted of creating a variable χ and assigning it different values
corresponding to the degree of IT business of each firm. To this extent we assigned value
χ = 1 (i.e. the firm operates in the IT sector) to Data Processing Services; Media; Internet
and Direct Marketing Retail; Health Care Technology; Biotechnology; Capital Markets;
Financial Exchanges & Data; Mortgage REITs; Information Technology; Communication
Services and Real Estate; value χ = 0.5 (i.e.the firm operates in a sector which has been
partially transformed by IT) to Aerospace & Defense; Education Services; Health Care
Services; Pharmaceuticals; Life Sciences Tools and Services and χ = 0 (the firm does not
operate in the IT sector) for the remaining sectors.
All variables but dummy variables used in the Surplus Wealth analysis in section 1.5 are then
standardized and will have an ”s” before indicating standardization, whilst lower case typed
variables in the investment analysis section 1.6 will indicate their logarithmic transformation.
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Before turning into logs, variables have been divided by total assets to correct for heteroskedas-
ticity and nominal variables included in the regression have been deflated by the GDP price
index (except for investment in tangible capital that has been adjusted by the investment goods
price index).
Three different panel are then constructed: (1) the representative sample, purged from
outliers according to the two-step procedure followed by Orhangazi (2008))23 and assumed to
be representative of the economy as a whole; (2) the Q2 sample, not purged from outliers and
containing all companies belonging to the 2nd quartile of the distribution of Surplus Wealth
and (3) the P95 sample that can be considered a subsample of the Q2 sample and collects all
companies in the 95th percentile of the distribution of Surplus Wealth, where monopolists lie,
as shown in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 (where only companies belonging to the 99th percentile
are reported). As one can easily notice from Table 1.1, 8 of the wealthiest firms in terms of
Surplus Wealth operate in fully transformed IT sectors (χ=1) and 13 out of 20 of them belong
to at least partially transformed IT sectors (χ=0.5 and χ=1), which is more than the half.
Keeping this in mind, we can now observe the distribution of companies operating in the IT
sector in 2018 in our three different samples, as illustrated in Figure 1.2:
(a) Representative sample (b) Q2 sample (c) P95 sample
Figure 1.2: Companies’ IT distribution in 2018, in the representative sample (panel (a)), in the
Q2 sample (panel (b)) and in the P95 sample (panel (c)). Author’s computations according to
GICS.
In all samples, the majority of firms belongs to the Non-IT sector (62% in the representative
sample, 60,1% in the Q2 sample and 51,5% in the P95 sample) and we can observe that the
percentage of US firms operating at least in a partially transformed IT sector increases as
we consider outliers and restrict the sample for higher Surplus Wealth (Figure 1.2b, 1.2c),
reaching nearly half of the pie in the monopolists’ sample (P95 sample). As a matter of fact,
the evolution of IT firms’ distribution over time (not reported) confirms the trend towards a
more IT transformed economy: the total of companies operating in partially-IT and IT sectors
was only the 15,2% in 1970 (representative sample); while it grew to 33,1% in 1995, going close
to 40% in 2018.
Finally, a general picture of firms’ distribution by sector is provided in Figure 1.3, which is
referred to the representative sample, but is similar for the other two samples (not reported in
figure):
23First firm variables’ means are calculated and then dropped if below the 1st percentile or above the 99th
percentile.
17
Figure 1.3: Companies’ Distribution by sector, SIC 2 digits code, representative sample.
The representative sample is mainly composed of manufacturing firms (more than 60% of the
total; it is 59% in the Q2 sample and 67% in the P95 sample), followed by services (around 20%,
also in the Q2 sample and 13% in the P95 sample) and retail trade (10% in the representative
sample and in the P95 sample and 8% in the Q2 sample). The distribution among the remaining
sectors is almost homogeneous.
1.4 Some Empirical Facts
Figure 1.4 shows the average Surplus Wealth on the entire sample over time: the increasing
trend stopped right after 2000 and fully recovered with an unprecedented spike only after 2010,
after the dramatic downfall in 2008 (probably due to the financial crisis).
Figure 1.4: Average Surplus Wealth (millions of dollars) from 1970 to 2018. Representative
sample.
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If we plot the same graph for all samples in the same scale (Figure 1.5) we can notice two main
features: (i) all trends are increasing and have the same turning points (ii) the scaling difference
on the y axis is absolutely shocking: firms belonging to the 95th percentile of the distribution
have extremely high values of Surplus Wealth – which we call monopoly Surplus Wealth – and
such magnitudes are not captured by neither the representative sample, neither the Q2 sample.
Figure 1.5: Average Surplus Wealth (millions of dollars) from 1970 to 2018 in the representative
sample (left), Q2 sample (center) and P95 sample (right) in the same scale.
If we decompose Surplus Wealth and observe the evolution of financial assets, we can notice
that, whilst the representative sample does not show particular similarities in the two trends
(Figure 1.4 vs. Figure 1.6 top left panel), the 95 sample displays the same drastic increase
after the 2008 fall (Figure 1.5 right panel vs. Figure 1.6 top right panel). Again, the value
of average financial assets held by firms in the representative sample shows huge differences
with the Q2 sample and the P95 sample (Figure 1.6, top panels) and the same is remarkable
also for short-term financial investment (Figure 1.6, bottom panels). A correlation table is also
provided in order to show the different relationships between short-term investment and the
two dependent variables questioned in Section 1.6: Table 1.2 highlights a strong discrepancy
between the correlation of intangible investment and short-term financial investment among
the different samples, in particular between the representative sample – where the correlation
is of 24% – and the Q2 sample and the P95 sample – where the correlations are up to 57%
and 55%, respectively – whilst the correlations of tangible capital investment and short-term
financial investment do not diverge that much in the different samples.
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Figure 1.6: Financial assets held by companies over time (top panels) and their short-term
financial investment (bottom panels). Representative sample (left), Q2 sample (center) and P95
sample (right).
Table 1.2: Correlation matrix for tangible capital investment, intangible investment and short-
term financial investment.
Representative sample Q2 sample P95 sample
Iκ I intan s.t. Ifin Iκ I intan s.t. Ifin Iκ I intan s.t. Ifin
Iκ 1 1 1
I intan 0.36 1 0.42 1 0.33 1
s.t.Ifin 0.20 0.24 1 0.27 0.57 1 0.22 0.55 1
Figure 1.7, instead, shows the average slowdown of capital accumulation: the downward
trend is quite similar in the representative sample and in the Q2 sample (left and central) –
confirming well known macroeconomic stylized facts – while it exhibits much more volatility in
the P95 sample (right). Figure 1.8, illustrates the opposite trend of average intangible assets
held by companies as a percentage of total assets. Although the upward trend is a common
feature in all samples, companies in the representative sample hold 21,2% of assets in intangibles
in 2018 (left), while if we consider only firms with a Surplus Wealth above the median, they
hold 27,2% of assets in knowledge or patents (central); while companies belonging to the 95th
percentile the 30,5% (right). The role of intangibles has increased over time and nowadays it is
not only referable to the fight for patents. A lot of intangible value comes also from the brand
itself (and related monetary efforts – marketing, advertising –) and is also strictly related to
the IT sector development. Think about Big Data collection: as Stiglitz puts it “The existence
of technology giants’ market power is seen most dramatically every time Facebook changes its
algorithms, the way it determines what individual see and in what order. A new algorithm can
bring on the quick decline of a media outlet, or can create, and then possibly end, new ways of
reaching large audiences (as in Facebook Live)”24.
24Stiglitz (2019), page 124.
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Figure 1.7: Average (tangible) capital stock as a percentage of total assets over time. Represen-
tative sample (left), Q2 sample (center) and P95 sample (right).
Figure 1.8: Average intangible capital stock as a percentage of total assets over time. Represen-
tative sample (left), Q2 sample (center) and P95 sample (right).
1.5 Analysis on Surplus Wealth
1.5.1 Surplus Wealth: Econometric Specification
We try to econometrically address the first research question by using in our specification
model a set of control variables (sales, leverage, Tobin’s q and labor productivity), a proxy
for intangible investment and a set of financialization variables (which include acquisitions,
dividend payments, stock buyback, new issuance of stocks and bonds and financial profits).
The complete specification is the following:
sSWi,t =α + β1sSALESi,t + β2sLEVi,t + β3sTobinQi,t + β4sLprodi,t
+ β5sI
intan
i,t + β6ACQi,t + β7sDIVi,t + β8sBUY BACKi,t
+ β9sMKT FINANCEi,t + β10sπ
fin
i,t + ci + ρt + vi,t
(1.3)
which is a fixed-effect model accounting for individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity, ci,
and time fixed-effect ρt, and with vi,t ∼ IID(0, σ2v), being the idiosyncratic error term. Each
variable but the dummy ACQi,t has been standardized and is at time t because the dependent
variable is not the outcome of a decision process (like, for example investment): we are just
checking period determinants of current Surplus Wealth, assuming that it entails monopoly
power for those firms at the very top of the distribution.
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1.5.2 Surplus Wealth: Estimated Results
Table 1.3 shows results for the representative sample: financialization variables seem to
have a positive and very significant impact on companies’ Surplus Wealth as well as sales,
intangibles’ expenditure and the Tobin’s q; while leverage has a significant negative effect and
labor productivity seems to play no role.
Table 1.3: Fixed-effect regression of Surplus Wealth on sales, leverage, Tobin’s q, labor produc-
tivity, acquisitions, intangibles’ proxy, dividends paid, buybacks, newly issued stocks and bonds
and financial profits. All variables but dummies standardized. Period 1970-2018. Representative
sample.
Representative sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt
sSALESt 0.344*** 0.191*** 0.343*** 0.180*** 0.323*** 0.328*** 0.169*** 0.0777
(0.0719) (0.0670) (0.0719) (0.0581) (0.0717) (0.0717) (0.0584) (0.0567)
sLEVt -0.0349*** -0.0393*** -0.0346*** -0.0382*** -0.0373*** -0.0344*** -0.0383*** -0.0407***
(0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0118) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0119) (0.0120)
sTobinQt 0.178*** 0.184*** 0.178*** 0.169*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.175***
(0.0223) (0.0232) (0.0223) (0.0212) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0213) (0.0221)
sLprodt 0.00183 -0.00259 0.00237 0.00324 0.00236 0.00165 0.00365 -0.000275
(0.00638) (0.00468) (0.00648) (0.00618) (0.00639) (0.00634) (0.00627) (0.00462)
sI intant 0.336*** 0.268***
(0.0619) (0.0576)
ACQt 0.0378** 0.0282** 0.0198
(0.0156) (0.0131) (0.0127)
sDIVt 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.195***
(0.0531) (0.0527) (0.0491)
sBUY BACKt 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.162***
(0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0298)
sMKT FINANCEt 0.0569** 0.0136 -0.00998
(0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0240)
sπfint 0.0653*** 0.0348 0.0102
(0.0232) (0.0215) (0.0183)
N. obs. 55768 55768 55768 55768 55768 55768 55768 55768
N. firms 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256
R2 within 0.208 0.267 0.209 0.302 0.212 0.212 0.304 0.339
R2 between 0.230 0.390 0.234 0.432 0.236 0.246 0.438 0.518
R2 overall 0.216 0.315 0.218 0.362 0.221 0.224 0.365 0.415
Adj. R2 0.208 0.266 0.208 0.302 0.211 0.211 0.304 0.338
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Focusing on financialization variables, we can notice the major contribution brought by div-
idends payments, sDIVt, and stock buyback, sBUY BACKt, to Surplus Wealth: the stan-
dardized coefficient -significant at the 1% level- ranges from 0.195 to 0.219 for the former
and from 0.162 to 0.183 for the latter in all specifications (columns (4), (7), (8))25 and that
they are higher than the coefficient of standardized sales. Additionally, specifications includ-
25Since we are dealing with standardized variables (with mean=0 and sd=1), in order to compute the effect
on the unstandardized variable, SW , we have to multiply the standardized beta for SW standard deviation
(which can be found in Table3)
22
ing dividends payments and buybacks are also those which can explain the greatest portion
of variation in the dependent variable among all specifications considered: the R2 between
in columns (4), (7) and (8) are indeed of 43.2%, 43.8% and 51.8%, respectively. Given that
dividend payments and stock buyback are both an expression of shareholders’ interests, this
first result confirms the shareholders’ value orientation of the economy, adding some evidence
on its impact on companies additional wealth. Such financial payments to the market indeed
may impact on Surplus Wealth passing through the Excess Market Value component (see eq.
(1.2)), that in turn depends on stock prices and hence market expectations26. Dividend pay-
ments and stock repurchase enhance stock prices, increasing market perceived value of a firm
and thus increasing Surplus Wealth. Such a positive effect therefore is not be associated with
the specific firm’s business activity or long-term growth, but with the confidence agents have
in the company’s ability to generate wealth for its owners. The significance of the acquisition
dummy, ACQt, suggests that firms can acquire other companies for strategic reasons: the ac-
quisition of existing businesses through increased ownership can increase sSWt by 0.0282-0.0378
(columns (3), (7)) and may represent a source of market power, given it increases concentra-
tion. Another financialization channel that may impact on Surplus Wealth is market funding,
sMKT FINANCEi,t : issuance of new equity might affect market value directly because the
share price must be attractive for new investors so, again, we are dealing with value oriented
perspectives. Even though shares are typically sold at a price that is lower with respect to that
of the outstanding shares, the fact that the new shares will be easily then traded will increase
their value. Hence I expected the Issuance of New Stock to significantly and positively affect
Surplus Wealth through shareholders’ value orientation. On the other hand the prediction of
the effect of new bonds’ issuance is not as straightforward (many factors, from the project to be
funded to ratings delivered by CRAs, are related to bonds’ issuance). The result is not clearcut:
the positive coefficient (column (5)) turns statistically non-significant as other financialization
variables are included (column(7)) and finally negative (column (8)). A similar behaviour is
observable for standardized financial profits, sπfint in column (6): as an expression of success-
ful past financial investment they can fuel further financial investments and increase Surplus
Wealth –by eq.(1.2– significantly by 102,96 millions. Once again, however, the significance
shades away for longer specifications (columns (7), (8)).27. The most important variable ap-
pears, however, to be intangibles’ expenditure, sI intant : a 1 standard deviation increase, indeed,
produces an increase of 529,77 millions (column (2)) (or 422,55 millions in column (8)). R&D
and advertising expenditure, therefore appear to be the drivers of Surplus Wealth, probably
given the competitive advantage that may provide. sI intant is followed by sSALEt and the To-
bin’s q: firms’ growth opportunities still play a role in determining Surplus Wealth28. Finally,
negative coefficients are recorded for leverage, sLEVt, suggesting that market perceptions on
the levels of firms’ indebtedness can reduce surplus Wealth. Labor productivity, Lprodt should
26Introducing expectations in the analysis may be interesting, but it is left for future works.
27For completeness, column (8) suffers from the high correlation between sSALESt and sI
intan
t (48.3%), and
sSALESt and sDIVt (43.6%) which might distort results and bias sSALESt coefficient.
28On the Tobin’s q, we follow the existing literature on Net Lending29
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ideally be one of the outcomes of technological progress: innovation should bring about labor
productivity as well and, as a result, wages should be aligned to such an increase, thus possibly
having a negative impact on Surplus Wealth. Table 3 does not tell this story.
Overall, by looking at results stemming from Table 1.3, we can say that sales, Tobin’s q, in-
tangibles’ expenditure and shareholders’ value orientation (dividends paid and stock buyback)
appear to be the drivers of companies’ Surplus Wealth, whilst we cannot conclude anything
about profits coming from financial investment. Finally, a period subsample analysis is per-
formed and results are shown in Appendix B.2: from 1970 to 1985, (Table 4), no financialization
variable but stock buyback -with a substantial lower magnitude- is significant at any level nor it
is intangibles’ expenditure. The major contribution to Surplus Wealth comes from sales; from
1970 to 1985, intangibles’ expenditure starts having a positive impact on Surplus Wealth as
well as financial profits; and from 2002 to 2018, there is almost a replication of Table 1.3. Next,
Table 1.4 presents results on the same specifications but on two different samples: starting
from the entire database and not managing outliers, in order not to loose monopolists (once we
drop outliers, indeed, companies reported in Table 1.1, for example, disappear) we take into
account firms belonging to the 2nd quartile of the Surplus Wealth distribution (Q2 sample) and
those belonging to the 95th percentile (P95 sample). Before proceeding, it is worth noting an
interesting correlation: our measure of Surplus Wealth positively correlates with Net Lending30:
38.8% in the representative sample, and 62.4% and 60.8% in the Q2 sample and P95 sample
respectively, suggesting that there might exist a relationship -not explored here- between the
accumulation of Surplus Wealth among wealthiest companies and their position as net lenders.
Table 1.4: Fixed-effect regression of Surplus Wealth on sales, leverage, Tobin’s q, labor produc-
tivity, acquisitions, intangibles’ proxy, dividends paid, buybacks, newly issued stocks and bonds
and financial profits. All variables but dummies standardized. Period 1970-2018. Q2 sample
(left) and P95 sample (right).
Q2 sample P95 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt
sSALESt 0.514*** 0.287*** 0.514*** 0.146* 0.484*** 0.485*** 0.127* 0.0703** 0.389** 0.256** 0.387** 0.136 0.370** 0.360** 0.116 0.0720
(0.152) (0.102) (0.152) (0.0777) (0.148) (0.155) (0.0761) (0.0353) (0.165) (0.121) (0.163) (0.0937) (0.160) (0.167) (0.0914) (0.0466)
sLEVt -0.257 -0.272 -0.258 -0.260 -0.259 -0.260 -0.262 -0.270 0.000152 -0.00476 0.000695 -0.0414 -0.00723 0.00253 -0.0410 -0.0397*
(0.213) (0.216) (0.213) (0.214) (0.213) (0.213) (0.214) (0.216) (0.0330) (0.0220) (0.0330) (0.0293) (0.0308) (0.0335) (0.0291) (0.0221)
sTobinQt 0.320 0.338 0.321 0.324 0.322 0.323 0.326 0.336 0.402** 0.422** 0.406** 0.404** 0.403** 0.407** 0.410** 0.423**
(0.264) (0.268) (0.265) (0.265) (0.265) (0.265) (0.266) (0.268) (0.172) (0.168) (0.171) (0.173) (0.172) (0.170) (0.172) (0.169)
sLprodt -0.00187 0.00297 -0.00183 0.00180 -0.00134 -0.00286 0.00137 0.00385 0.000458 0.00223 0.000452 0.000269 0.000835 -0.000357 -0.0000823 0.00141
(0.00592) (0.00450) (0.00591) (0.00294) (0.00572) (0.00807) (0.00406) (0.00252) (0.00556) (0.00701) (0.00561) (0.00362) (0.00572) (0.00643) (0.00401) (0.00423)
sI intant 0.491*** 0.351*** 0.431*** 0.344***
(0.0770) (0.0913) (0.0862) (0.0951)
ACQt 0.0211 0.00324 -0.00989 0.110* 0.0617 0.0252
(0.0180) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0580) (0.0396) (0.0398)
sDIVt 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.148*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.0894*
(0.0387) (0.0365) (0.0476) (0.0446) (0.0421) (0.0467)
sBUY BACKt 0.315*** 0.305*** 0.278*** 0.311*** 0.297*** 0.276***
(0.0695) (0.0767) (0.0817) (0.0764) (0.0854) (0.0855)
sMKT FINANCEt 0.0840** 0.0292 -0.00923 0.0647 0.0306 -0.00350
(0.0415) (0.0223) (0.0244) (0.0465) (0.0256) (0.0312)
sπfint 0.125** 0.0707 0.0324 0.143*** 0.0930* 0.0542
(0.0504) (0.0441) (0.0395) (0.0543) (0.0510) (0.0441)
N. obs. 71054 71054 71054 71054 71054 71054 71054 71054 7135 7135 7135 7135 7135 7135 7135 7135
N. firms 6348 6348 6348 6348 6348 6348 6348 6348 836 836 836 836 836 836 836 836
R2 within 0.191 0.318 0.191 0.355 0.195 0.201 0.359 0.413 0.443 0.533 0.445 0.551 0.446 0.455 0.558 0.609
R2 between 0.252 0.446 0.252 0.478 0.255 0.297 0.496 0.598 0.186 0.235 0.185 0.216 0.190 0.212 0.235 0.256
R2 overall 0.244 0.424 0.245 0.476 0.249 0.268 0.486 0.555 0.384 0.520 0.386 0.541 0.388 0.404 0.553 0.620
Adj. R2 0.190 0.317 0.190 0.355 0.195 0.201 0.359 0.412 0.439 0.530 0.441 0.548 0.442 0.451 0.554 0.606
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
30Net Lending is a measure of excess savings and is calculated as net income plus depreciation and amortization
minus capital expenditures. See Villani (2021) for more details.
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In both samples leverage looses its significance, whilst growth opportunities appear to have
a wide impact on monopoly Surplus Wealth (i.e. in the P95 sample) together with sales
and intangibles’ expenditure (the latter variables basically replicate their behaviour as in the
representative sample). Again, shareholders’ value orientation plays a crucial role also in the
2nd quartile and in the 95th percentile of the distribution of Surplus Wealth, where a 1 standard
deviation increase in sDIVt increases sSWt on average by 0.256 and 0.165, respectively (columns
(4) and (12); it was 0.219 in the representative sample) – that is an impact of 403.63 and 260.15,
respectively, on the unstandardized Surplus Wealth – while if we augment sBUY BACKt’s
standard deviation by 1, sSWt positively moves by 0.315 in the Q2 sample (columns (4)) and
by 0.313 in the P95 sample – that is by 496.66 in the Q2 sample and by 493.5 in the P95 sample
(notice that the magnitude of stock repurchase almost doubles for wealthiest companies with
respect to the representative sample). The standardized coefficients for dividends payments
and stock buyback remains significantly high also when other financialization variables as well
as the intangible proxy are added (columns (7), (8), (15), (16)). Lastly, we can observe that
also financial profits doubles its coefficient when it comes to high levels of Surplus Wealth:
in the representative sample the average increase of sSWt was of 0.0635 whilst we notice a
0.125 increase in the Q2 sample (column (6)) and a 0.143 increase in the P95 sample (column
(14)) after augmenting (standardized) financial profits’ of 1 standard deviation. Interestingly,
financial profits remains significant once other financialization variables are included in the
regression (column (15)) in the P95 sample.
To sum up, in all samples the drivers of Surplus Wealth appear to be related to (i) the
size of firms (sSALESt); (ii) intangibles’ expenditure (sI
intan
t ) -which has the largest impact in
terms of magnitude- and (iii) a selection of financialization variables, sDIVt and sBUY BACKt
above all, and sπfint , which is however not robust to more complete specifications except for
the P95 sample. Financialization in the form of shareholders’ value orientation, hence, seems
to play a role in the accumulation of Surplus Wealth, especially for firms with a value of
Surplus Wealth above the median and for monopolists (in which case also the effect of financial
profits become more robust), suggesting that it contributes to monopoly rents together with
intangibles’ investment. One last remark: interestingly, in the representative sample and in
the Q2 sample the various models are able to explain the variation among companies’ Surplus
Wealth more than the variation within them; in the P95 sample, the situation is reversed and
we find that the model regressions are more able to explain Surplus Wealth variation within
the same firm rather than among the different companies.
1.6 Analysis on Investment
1.6.1 Investment: Econometric Specification
In order to test the impact of financial investments, two multiple regression analysis are here
conducted: one on tangible capital investment, and the other one on intangible investment,
proxied by the sum of R&D and advertising expenditure. The analysis has two main goals:
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(i) understanding whether financial assets shape or not companies’ tangible capital investment
decisions and/or intangible capital investment decisions; (ii) assessing their role for monopolists
in particular. A first variable of interest will be past financial profits, ln πfint−1, which tell
us if dividends and interests stemming from financial investment are then re-invested into
production. The variable has two limitations: (i) it accounts only for interest and dividend
income (we have no information on capital gains) and (ii) the logarithm of πfin has many
missing values. We expect financial profits to have an impact on both capital expenditure and
intangible expenditure in all samples, because they sistematically increase available internal
funds for whatever purpose. The second variable of interest is financial assets, redτ , which is
proxied by redundant assets and the third is short-term financial investment, s.t. ifinτ , which
is assumed to entail speculative properties given their highly liquid nature. Both variables are
used at time t (to look for a trade-off effect between them and the dependent variable) and in
one lag (one can imagine that past financial assets or short-term investment can yield returns
or capital gains in period t, so past year financial investments might potentially entail returns
and capital gains earned and used in the subsequent year), thus τ = {t − 1, t}. Since past
financial profits, financial investment and short-term financial investment -current and past-
are highly correlated with each other, separate regressions will be run. Other control variables
are then: past sales, salest−1, which as a primary source of internal funds are expected to serve
both tangible capital expenditure and R&D and advertising expenditure31; Long-term debt,
debtt−1, that we expect to be actually unimportant for monopolist firms but more decisive
for more competitive firms’ investment decisions; financial payments, payfint−1, that includes
dividends’ payments, stock buyback (and thus represents shareholders’ value orientation) and
cash commitments to financial markets, it can represent a constraint for any type of investment
and might decrease expenditure (the value rather than growth idea), in line with previous
studies on capital investment behaviour (see, for example Orhangazi (2008)); the dummy for
acquisitions, ACQt, may behave differently in the different samples: we expect acquisitions to
have a negative effect on investment for monopolist companies in particular, given the strategic
intrinsic nature of these operations (we are assuming that monopolists acquire firms to further
reduce competition or not to loose monopoly rents), whilst other firms may acquire other
(innovative) firms seeking for monopoly rents (and thus continuing to invest). Summing up,
the econometric specifications is the following:
iXi,t = α + β1i
X
i,t−1 + β2salesi,t−1 + β3debti,t−1 + β4pay
fin
i,t−1 + β5ACQi,t−1 + +β6Fi,τ + vi,t (1.4)
with X = {κ; intan}, Fi,τ being the set of financial variables of interest (ln πfini,t−1, redi,τ and
s.t. ifini,τ ), with τ = {t − 1; t} and vi,t = ui + εi,t. The first observation about the specification
concerns the first lag of the dependent variable used as a predictor: this will cause an endo-
geneity problem using static models (either fixed or random) exactly because past values of the
31Sales can also account for the impact of past operating profits on investment: the two variables have
a positive correlation of more than 80% and using operating profits instead of sales does not alter results
significantly.
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dependent variable are used as regressors, hence they are not independent and are correlated
with the error term. Recurring to a dynamic two-step GMM panel model should overcome such
identification problem. Given that both subsamples are unbalanced panels, orthogonal devia-
tions seems to be more appropriate32, for it better deals with missing observations (by using
the mean of all future values instead of just the past value to be subtracted to the observation
of interest in constructing instruments). The specification model in eq. (1.4) is similar to that
of Orhangazi (2008) and it is assumed to be the same for both tangible and intangible capital
investment.
1.6.2 Investment: Estimated Results
Table 1.5 presents results concerning capital investment using the representative sample.
As a preliminary note, both the signs and the significance of some selected regressors are in line
with evidence provided by Orhangazi (2008): lagged investment, iκt−1 and past sales, salest−1
are the main drivers of current investments in all specifications, while long-term debt, debtt−1
and financial payments, payfint−1 negatively affect current investment
33. The same behaviour
can be found in Table 1.6, which shows results for the same regressions but in the Q2 sample
and in the P95 sample, with the only interesting exception of financial payments in the latter
sample, where we can observe that having to pay for interests, dividends or to re-acquire
shares has no effect on capital expenditure for monopolists. Back on Table 1.5, the only
contradicting result concerns financial profits, ln πfint−1, whose 1% increase, instead, appears
to increase current investment on average by 3.62%34. This positive relationship seems to be
confirmed by columns (4) and (5), where past financial investments, redt−1, and lagged short-
term financial investment, s.t. ifint−1, in particular, seem to contribute to capital investment.
Ceteris paribus, hence, having more internal funds -in the form of financial profits or short-term
financial investment (which are a component of cash and cash equivalent and therefore easily
convertible) in the previous period may be beneficial to investment in tangible capital. However,
we cannot exclude a trade-off effect between capital investments and financial investments:
columns (2) and (3), indeed, indicate that the decision to increase financial assets by 1% today,
decreases capital investment by almost 3% (column (3), and almost 2% if we consider short-
term financial investment (column (4))), leaving the overall effect of financial assets on capital
expenditure unclear.
If we now observe the outcomes of financial investments on tangible capital investments
considering companies with a Surplus Wealth above the median (Q2 sample) and those at
the very top of the distribution (P95 sample), the story further changes. In the Q2 sample
(Table 1.6 left panel) there is no positive effect of past financial investments (column (4), (5))
32see Arellano and Bover (1995) and Roodman (2009) for more details.
33Orhangazi (2008) includes also profit among the regressors, which in the present datasets, exhibits a
serious positive correlation with sales and is hence excluded. Substituting sales with profit does not alter
results significantly (not reported).
34Notice that, although it is true that column (1) in Table 1.5 fails many tests -most importantly the AR(2)
test- the coefficient of ln πfint−1 remains positive and highly significant in all subsamples’ analysis (Table 1.9 and
Table 5) as well as in regression results’ on Q2 sample and P95 sample (Table 1.6).
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while the negative trade-off between capital expenditure and current financial investment is
confirmed (columns(2), (3)). Finally, Table 1.6 right panel, tells us that financial investments
(current and past, both in the form of redundant assets and in the form of short-term financial
investment) are almost irrelevant for capital expenditure decisions for wealthiest companies: the
trade-off effect nearly disappears for most rich firms, suggesting that higher financial investment
today do not offset physical capital investment as much as in the representative sample and Q2
sample (the negative sign remains, indeed, and redt is significant at 10% confidence interval).
A last comment on the acquisition dummy, ACQt−1: its positive and significant effect
observable in the representative sample, is reversed once we move to the Q2 sample and the
P95 sample. In both panels of Table 1.6, indeed, we can say that having acquired a new
firm in the previous period decreases current capital expenditure by around 2-3%. Not all
specifications, however, corroborate the statistical significance of these coefficients.
Table 1.5: Dynamic GMM in orthogonal deviations regression of capital investment on past cap-
ital investment, sales, long-term debt, financial payments, acquisition dummy, financial profits
and current and lagged financial investment (total and short-term). Period 1970-2018. Repre-
sentative sample.
Representative sample










iκt−1 0.291*** 0.273*** 0.295*** 0.270*** 0.394***
(0.0516) (0.0551) (0.0712) (0.0590) (0.0767)
salest−1 0.292*** 0.262*** 0.295*** 0.311*** 0.286***
(0.0349) (0.0294) (0.0398) (0.0314) (0.0413)
debtt−1 -0.0299*** -0.0296*** -0.0305*** -0.0246*** -0.0254***
(0.00548) (0.00520) (0.00634) (0.00537) (0.00599)
payfint−1 -0.0352*** -0.0503*** -0.0476*** -0.0521*** -0.0341***
(0.00906) (0.00968) (0.0113) (0.01000) (0.0115)
ACQt−1 0.0294** 0.0136 0.0311** 0.0243* 0.0296**











N. obs. 22671 26761 16020 26913 16152
N. firms 1961 2076 1859 2073 1853
AR(1) test : z1 -8.21 -7.70 -6.02 -7.32 -6.40
Prob > z1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test : z2 -2.04 -1.55 -0.71 -1.83 -0.05
Prob > z2 0.042 0.120 0.477 0.067 0.962
Sargan test : J1 60.54 49.52 43.26 61.52 52.60
Prob > J1 0.050 0.262 0.503 0.041 0.175
Hansen test : J2 61.84 44.02 39.58 57.70 51.16
Prob > J2 0.039 0.471 0.661 0.081 0.213
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 1.6: Dynamic GMM in orthogonal deviations regression of capital investment on past
capital investment, sales, long-term debt, financial payments, acquisition dummy, financial profits
and current and lagged financial investment (total and short-term). Period 1970-2018. Q2 sample
(left panel) and P95 sample (right panel).
Q2 sample P95 sample




















iκt−1 0.276*** 0.284*** 0.168* 0.351*** 0.257*** 0.874*** 0.721*** 0.647*** 0.671*** 0.579***
(0.0792) (0.0741) (0.0908) (0.0696) (0.0887) (0.112) (0.138) (0.143) (0.144) (0.151)
salest−1 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.210*** 0.217*** 0.185*** 0.279*** 0.367*** 0.389*** 0.405*** 0.432***
(0.0307) (0.0291) (0.0360) (0.0285) (0.0325) (0.0835) (0.108) (0.123) (0.104) (0.125)
debtt−1 -0.0388*** -0.0381*** -0.0392*** -0.0366*** -0.0367*** -0.0236** -0.0190** -0.0248** -0.0207** -0.0267**
(0.00456) (0.00490) (0.00620) (0.00455) (0.00582) (0.0104) (0.00906) (0.0109) (0.00948) (0.0120)
payfint−1 -0.0261*** -0.0368*** -0.0442*** -0.0347*** -0.0415*** 0.00192 0.00688 -0.00361 0.000941 -0.0166
(0.00959) (0.0101) (0.0118) (0.00961) (0.0110) (0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0165) (0.0158) (0.0165)
ACQt−1 0.00218 -0.0238** -0.0192 -0.0215** -0.0187 -0.0108 -0.0260* -0.0314* -0.0227 -0.0279
(0.0118) (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0106) (0.0135) (0.0171) (0.0148) (0.0176) (0.0149) (0.0190)








s.t. ifint−1 0.00493 0.00879*
(0.00479) (0.00526)
N. obs. 20355 26642 16810 26520 16690 2713 3997 2970 3997 2974
N. firms 2907 3539 2709 3524 2693 327 433 358 435 360
AR(1) test : z1 -5.57 -6.23 -4.13 -7.09 -4.80 -5.26 -3.85 -3.09 -3.67 -2.85
Prob > z1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004
AR(2) test : z2 -1.28 -1.44 -2.18 -1.16 -1.60 0.67 0.89 0.44 0.82 0.26
Prob > z2 0.199 0.151 0.029 0.245 0.110 0.502 0.376 0.662 0.412 0.796
Sargan test : J1 26.95 22.27 18.11 19.42 22.11 37.05 49.84 43.85 54.13 45.47
Prob > J1 0.980 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.762 0.252 0.478 0.141 0.411
Hansen test : J2 58.57 37.37 32.62 33.03 33.85 45.43 43.34 35.85 48.38 41.18
Prob > J2 0.070 0.750 0.897 0.887 0.866 0.412 0.500 0.804 0.301 0.593
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p¡.1, ** p¡.05, *** p¡.01
After having investigated the effect of financial investments (and profits) on capital expendi-
ture, we now try to understand their effects on intangibles’ expenditure, proxied by companies’
R&D together with disbursements for marketing and branding, iintan. Before commenting on
that, however, we make a rapid note on the overall picture stemming from Table 1.7 below.
First, the dynamic panel GMM model turned out to be a good model, which was not a foregone
conclusion, given that we are assuming that intangibles’ investment decisions behave exactly
as capital investment decisions35. Second, salest−1 and debtt−1 affect capital investment and
35The goodness of the model falls short in the period subsample anaysis, suggesting that for short ranges
of time it is better to use a non-dynamic panel. In every subsample period in Table 6, indeed, we can notice
that lagged intangibles investment is not statistically significant in many cases and -as one can notice also from
the failure of AR(1) test. This might be due to the large amount of missing values generated when turning
variables into logs (R&D and advertising expenditure, indeed, do not count the large amount of observations
recorded for capital expenditure). Indeed, if we consider a more extended period for the period subsample
analysis (for example if we divide the representative sample into only two subperiods) this issue is less evident
and the only specifications that fail the AR(1) test are those that include s.t. ifin only, both current and lagged
(not reported).
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intangibles investment in a similar way, with a lower magnitude in the latter case. Third,
financial payments on the contrary seem to be irrelevant for intangible investment decisions,
whilst having acquired new firms decreases expenditure in R&D and branding by around 3%.
Finally, the positive significant effect of past financial investment disappears if we use them as
regressors to explain intangibles investment (columns (4), (5)), while a 1% increase in internal
funds in the form of financial profits makes R&D and branding expenditure rise on average by
3.10% (column (1), the coefficient is slightly lower with respect to the one reported for capi-
tal expenditure). Again, it seems to exist a trade-off effect with current financial investments
(columns (2), (3)) but the statistical significance is low and the magnitude is in the amount
of 0.8%. Overall, we can conclude that financialization has more impact on physical capital
expenditure rather than on intangibles expenditure, first of all through financial payments (neg-
ative and irrelevant, respectively) and then through financial profits (positive in both cases)
and financial investment (which do not offer a clear picture of their impact). The interesting
insight stemming from the two tables concerns the existence of a possible trade-off between real
investment (in terms of tangible and intangible capital, something needed in a firm’s production
activity) and financial investment, which appears however to be stronger for tangible capital
expenditure.
We now turn to the Q2 sample and to the P95 sample, whose regression outcomes can be
found in Table 1.8. Again, for monopolists (right panel) nor financial payments nor acquisitions
affect intangibles expenditure. The same holds for current financial investment (columns (7),
(8)), suggesting that the investments trade-off effect plays no role and that firms with some
market power, on average, can take decisions on how much to invest in R&D and marketing,
capital, and marketable securities independently. This result differs from the one characteriz-
ing the overall economy and from the one observable for companies belonging to the second
quartile of Surplus Wealth distribution where a trade-off effect seems instead to be in place.
Lastly, the story goes a little beyond: not only current financial investment are negligible for
monopolists’ intangible investment, but lagegd financial investment appear to be also positively
related to it as well as financial profits. There is hence some room for our initial assumption:
the acquisition of financial assets by companies detecting market power may be correlated to
strategic motives aimed at maintaining a privileged position in the market by involving R&D
and branding/marketing: financial rents appear to have a small role in augmenting monopoly
rents coming from intangibles.
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Table 1.7: Dynamic GMM in orthogonal deviations regression of intangible invest-
ment on past intangible investment, sales, long-term debt, financial payments,
acquisition dummy, financial profits and current and lagged financial investment
(total and short-term). Period 1970-2018. Representative sample.
Representative sample










iintant−1 0.541*** 0.394*** 0.315** 0.369*** 0.303***
(0.0977) (0.0983) (0.141) (0.100) (0.116)
salest−1 0.176*** 0.214*** 0.192*** 0.225*** 0.176***
(0.0340) (0.0381) (0.0347) (0.0379) (0.0354)
debtt−1 -0.0150*** -0.0148*** -0.0193*** -0.0132*** -0.0175***
(0.00381) (0.00445) (0.00549) (0.00452) (0.00575)
payfint−1 0.0161** 0.00596 0.00434 0.00393 0.00275
(0.00732) (0.00803) (0.0103) (0.00824) (0.00935)
ACQt−1 -0.0352*** -0.0281** -0.0185 -0.0327** -0.0311**











N. obs. 17942 20295 12419 20419 12520
N. firms 1725 1879 1610 1872 1604
AR(1) test : z1 -5.29 -4.48 -2.77 -4.25 -3.13
Prob > z1 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.002
AR(2) test : z2 1.77 1.32 0.57 1.15 0.52
Prob > z2 0.077 0.185 0.571 0.251 0.601
Sargan test : J1 25.79 53.81 54.46 49.22 51.00
Prob > J1 0.987 0.148 0.134 0.272 0.218
Hansen test : J2 35.36 61.73 55.50 51.76 52.43
Prob > J2 0.820 0.040 0.115 0.197 0.179
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 1.8: Dynamic GMM in orthogonal deviations regression of intangible investment on past
intangible investment, sales, long-term debt, financial payments, acquisition dummy, financial
profits and current and lagged financial investment (total and short-term). Period 1970-2018.
Q2 sample (left panel) and P95 sample (right panel).
Q2 sample P95 sample




















iintant−1 0.355** 0.420*** 0.465*** 0.411*** 0.404*** 0.351** 0.447** 0.414*** 0.451*** 0.475***
(0.147) (0.100) (0.150) (0.106) (0.147) (0.176) (0.187) (0.150) (0.167) (0.158)
salest−1 0.166*** 0.181*** 0.159*** 0.183*** 0.158*** 0.446*** 0.434*** 0.440*** 0.432*** 0.417***
(0.0278) (0.0252) (0.0262) (0.0260) (0.0250) (0.0972) (0.0926) (0.0939) (0.0864) (0.0909)
debtt−1 -0.0244*** -0.0218*** -0.0232*** -0.0229*** -0.0228*** -0.00751 -0.0153** -0.0143* -0.0156** -0.0164*
(0.00460) (0.00331) (0.00375) (0.00346) (0.00404) (0.00907) (0.00727) (0.00806) (0.00736) (0.00898)
payfint−1 0.0196*** 0.0204*** 0.0237*** 0.0186*** 0.0194*** -0.0199 -0.00130 -0.00205 0.00257 -0.00162
(0.00647) (0.00545) (0.00726) (0.00531) (0.00673) (0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0151) (0.0144) (0.0145)
ACQt−1 -0.0151 -0.0383*** -0.0380*** -0.0391*** -0.0365*** 0.0222 -0.00930 -0.0156 -0.00602 -0.0170
(0.0155) (0.0102) (0.0133) (0.0103) (0.0137) (0.0248) (0.0236) (0.0268) (0.0208) (0.0271)








s.t. ifint−1 0.00266 0.0144**
(0.00338) (0.00603)
N. obs. 15248 19508 12953 19441 12864 2477 3558 2686 3550 2685
N. firms 2196 2664 2097 2656 2085 271 351 300 353 302
AR(1) test : z1 -3.29 -4.87 -3.54 -4.51 -3.26 -2.49 -2.93 -3.01 -3.09 -3.07
Prob > z1 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
AR(2) test : z2 -0.14 0.63 0.51 0.36 0.37 0.70 1.59 1.25 1.51 1.51
Prob > z2 0.887 0.526 0.602 0.716 0.715 0.483 0.112 0.210 0.132 0.131
Sargan test : J1 29.91 19.95 19.54 26.41 18.54 51.73 55.45 55.51 57.43 58.60
Prob > J1 0.958 0.999 0.999 0.984 1.000 0.197 0.115 0.114 0.084 0.069
Hansen test : J2 46.75 34.04 26.90 38.59 25.81 48.08 44.71 39.44 45.42 42.07
Prob > J2 0.360 0.860 0.980 0.702 0.987 0.311 0.442 0.646 0.413 0.555
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
1.6.3 Investment: IT Subsamples’ Analysis
Since Figure1.2 illustrates a different composition in terms of IT firms in the different
samples, we take advantage of the possibility of running subsamples’ analysis in order to push
the discussion one step ahead: we want to figure out whether the investment behaviour observed
in the previous tables is the same for firms operating in the IT sector and those operating in
the non-IT sector or not, with particular attention paid to monopolists (P95 sample). We
then divide the samples according to whether a company has a χ = 0 (non-IT sector) or a
χ = {0.5, 1} (IT sector, both partially or fully). Table 1.9 shows results for the IT subsamples’
analysis (representative sample): the right panel suggests that although past financial profits
have a higher magnitude on capital expenditure for IT firms (column (6) vs. column (1)),
lagged investment themselves seem to play no role (column (9), (10)); whilst they do if we turn
to non-IT firms (column (4), (5)), where all regressors’ behavior basically replicate results in
Table 1.5 (trade-off effect between capital investment and financial investment included). Table
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1.11, instead, shows results for the P95 sample: financial profits and financial investment (both
at time t and at time t-1; both as assets and as short-term investment) seem to play absolutely
no role for IT firms36.
Concerning intangible investment for the representative sample, instead, Table 1.10 high-
lights that financial profits have greater effects in the IT sector (column (6) vs. column (1)37)
and that acquisitions in the previous period significantly decrease R&D and marketing expenses
considerably. Concerning financial assets and short-term financial investment, there is only a
timid significance of the trade-off effect for the former variable in both subsamples38. Lastly,
in the P95 sample the acquisition dummy looses of importance and our variables of interest
become significant only for the IT subsample, where financial profits, but mostly, past financial
assets and past short-term financial investment are highly significant and with a positive influ-
ence on intangible expenditure (Table1.12, right panel). One can interpret this result as the fact
that higher returns (also in terms of capital gains) provided from holding/selling financial assets
also increases expenditure in order to maintain monopoly rents stemming from IT innovations
and branding. Moreover, there is no room for the trade-off effect (current short-term financial
investment are even positive and significant (Table1.12), column (8)), whilst the negative sign
persists in the Non-IT subsample (but there is no significance). This important result seems
to confirm our assumption of a liaison between market power (remember that corporations in
the P95 sample are those belonging to the 95th percentile of Surplus Wealth distribution), IT
and financialization in the form of financial investment.
36In the Q2 sample IT firms are not affected by financial profits and lagged financial investment but there
exists a trade-off with current financial investment and capital expenditure, non-reported table
37the same holds for the Q2 sample, table not reported
38in the Q2 sample the trade-off effect holds for both types of financial investment at time t while they are
insignificant in t-1, not reported
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Table 1.9: Dynamic GMM in orthogonal deviations regression of capital investment
on past capital investment, sales, long-term debt, financial payments, acquisition
dummy, financial profits and current and lagged financial investment (total and
short-term). Period 1970-2018. Representative sample: Non-IT subsample (left
panel) and IT subsample (right panel).
Representative sample
NON-IT SUBSAMPLE IT SUBSAMPLE




















iκt−1 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.344*** 0.302*** 0.424*** 0.345*** 0.229** 0.164 0.222* 0.191
(0.0545) (0.0546) (0.0700) (0.0587) (0.0732) (0.0995) (0.114) (0.129) (0.133) (0.142)
salest−1 0.333*** 0.306*** 0.350*** 0.362*** 0.338*** 0.261*** 0.198*** 0.260*** 0.230*** 0.247***
(0.0413) (0.0342) (0.0434) (0.0358) (0.0475) (0.0596) (0.0506) (0.0669) (0.0543) (0.0621)
debtt−1 -0.0347*** -0.0357*** -0.0378*** -0.0331*** -0.0272*** -0.0206** -0.0224*** -0.0213** -0.0142* -0.0171*
(0.00705) (0.00683) (0.00904) (0.00703) (0.00883) (0.00842) (0.00756) (0.00926) (0.00805) (0.00911)
payfint−1 -0.0384*** -0.0471*** -0.0485*** -0.0479*** -0.0305** -0.0261* -0.0458*** -0.0624*** -0.0524*** -0.0548***
(0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0132) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0148) (0.0171) (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.0202)
ACQt−1 0.0425*** 0.0136 0.0351** 0.0279* 0.0370** -0.00885 -0.00118 0.0192 0.00156 0.0118
(0.0146) (0.0136) (0.0175) (0.0144) (0.0181) (0.0256) (0.0247) (0.0252) (0.0263) (0.0246)










N. obs. 16556 19842 11356 19976 11471 6115 6919 4664 6937 4681
N.firms 1375 1437 1279 1434 1283 586 639 580 639 570
AR(1) test : z1 -7.74 -7.90 -6.37 -7.40 -6.70 -4.82 -3.69 -2.92 -3.20 -2.75
Prob > z1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.006
AR(2) test : z2 -1.96 -1.14 -0.13 -1.67 0.39 -0.44 -0.79 -1.02 -0.77 -0.99
Prob > z2 0.050 0.254 0.898 0.095 0.699 0.663 0.428 0.307 0.443 0.322
Sargan test : J1 57.23 36.53 57.88 45.77 66.59 36.56 46.50 25.84 50.00 34.46
Prob > J1 0.087 0.780 0.078 0.399 0.016 0.779 0.370 0.987 0.247 0.848
Hansen test : J2 62.61 33.79 45.08 45.52 48.57 36.94 39.00 32.66 45.05 36.98
Prob > J2 0.034 0.867 0.427 0.409 0.294 0.766 0.685 0.896 0.428 0.764
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 1.10: Dynamic GMM in orthogonal deviations regression of intangible investment on past
intangible investment, sales, long-term debt, financial payments, acquisition dummy, financial
profits and current and lagged financial investment (total and short-term). Period 1970-2018.
Representative sample: Non-IT subsample (left panel) and IT subsample (right panel).
Representative sample
NON-IT SUBSAMPLE IT SUBSAMPLE




















iintant−1 0.567*** 0.386*** 0.547*** 0.397*** 0.490*** 0.366*** 0.495*** 0.350** 0.492*** 0.358**
(0.122) (0.126) (0.140) (0.109) (0.135) (0.124) (0.131) (0.153) (0.121) (0.157)
salest−1 0.180*** 0.256*** 0.201*** 0.283*** 0.179*** 0.189*** 0.163*** 0.148*** 0.168*** 0.137***
(0.0608) (0.0682) (0.0563) (0.0700) (0.0661) (0.0407) (0.0363) (0.0376) (0.0338) (0.0367)
debtt−1 -0.00945* -0.0104 -0.0106* -0.0106 -0.0117* -0.0220*** -0.0160*** -0.0208*** -0.0133** -0.0154**
(0.00520) (0.00675) (0.00633) (0.00685) (0.00670) (0.00666) (0.00595) (0.00622) (0.00594) (0.00721)
payfint−1 0.0223** 0.00508 0.0142 0.00652 0.0125 0.00841 0.0150 0.0163 0.0146 0.0137
(0.00929) (0.0120) (0.0134) (0.0110) (0.0132) (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0116)
Acqt−1 -0.0225 -0.0147 -0.0180 -0.0199 -0.0303* -0.0680*** -0.0716*** -0.0578** -0.0810*** -0.0548**
(0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0156) (0.0171) (0.0182) (0.0191) (0.0224) (0.0177) (0.0223)








s.t. ifint−1 0.00291 0.00261
(0.00487) (0.00806)
N. obs. 12628 14485 8410 14595 8491 5314 5810 4009 5824 4029
N. firms 1181 1287 1080 1284 1076 544 592 530 588 528
AR(1) test : z1 -4.29 -3.37 -3.44 -3.75 -3.27 -3.35 -4.05 -2.72 -4.21 -2.57
Prob > z1 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.010
AR(2) test : z2 1.79 1.03 1.53 1.04 1.42 0.24 1.13 -0.12 1.14 -0.39
Prob > z2 0.073 0.304 0.127 0.299 0.154 0.809 0.258 0.904 0.253 0.695
Sargan test : J1 29.24 47.90 68.07 44.07 65.73 20.23 64.42 47.42 52.12 53.22
Prob > J1 0.957 0.318 0.011 0.469 0.019 0.999 0.024 0.335 0.187 0.161
Hansen test : J2 35.81 48.89 45.68 40.76 54.92 37.55 60.38 48.52 53.43 50.02
Prob > J2 0.806 0.283 0.402 0.611 0.125 0.743 0.051 0.296 0.156 0.247
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 1.11: Dynamic GMM in orthogonal deviations regression of capital investment on past
capital investment, sales, long-term debt, financial payments, acquisition dummy, financial profits
and current and lagged financial investment (total and short-term). Period 1970-2018. P95
sample: Non-IT subsample (left panel) and IT subsample (right panel).
P95 sample
NON-IT SUBSAMPLE IT SUBSAMPLE




















iκt−1 0.733*** 0.658*** 0.758*** 0.644*** 0.675*** 0.680*** 0.558*** 0.575*** 0.565*** 0.562***
(0.124) (0.147) (0.145) (0.137) (0.141) (0.132) (0.125) (0.130) (0.143) (0.140)
salest−1 0.319*** 0.387*** 0.315** 0.400*** 0.321** 0.314** 0.448*** 0.480*** 0.427*** 0.488***
(0.115) (0.123) (0.128) (0.113) (0.128) (0.124) (0.111) (0.110) (0.113) (0.109)
debtt−1 -0.0340*** -0.0316*** -0.0325*** -0.0347*** -0.0405*** -0.0332* -0.0152 -0.0199* -0.0170 -0.0170
(0.0109) (0.00897) (0.0121) (0.00970) (0.0115) (0.0187) (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0121) (0.0122)
payfint−1 0.00473 0.0292 0.0376 0.0215 0.0190 -0.0169 -0.00616 -0.0207 -0.00372 -0.0261*
(0.0167) (0.0207) (0.0232) (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0280) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0155)
ACQt−1 0.0241 -0.00611 -0.0210 0.00589 -0.0101 -0.0260 -0.0436* -0.0314 -0.0535** -0.0106









s.t. ifint−1 0.0143* 0.0108
(0.00829) (0.00679)
N. obs. 1659 2379 1592 2383 1603 1054 1618 1378 1615 1371
N. firms 204 275 215 277 216 123 158 143 158 144
AR(1) test : z1 -4.01 -2.81 -2.26 -2.79 -2.24 -3.61 -3.44 -3.28 -3.21 -3.01
Prob > z1 0.000 0.005 0.024 0.005 0.025 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
AR(2) test : z2 0.15 1.10 0.82 1.06 0.72 0.77 -0.19 -0.17 -0.06 -0.12
Prob > z2 0.877 0.272 0.413 0.289 0.469 0.442 0.847 0.867 0.953 0.907
Sargan test : J1 35.17 30.81 28.51 32.82 25.36 57.23 59.29 43.97 60.07 49.46
Prob > J1 0.826 0.934 0.966 0.892 0.989 0.087 0.062 0.473 0.054 0.264
Hansen test : J2 40.14 35.64 39.98 40.38 47.98 47.37 32.91 31.77 35.53 35.26
Prob > J2 0.638 0.811 0.645 0.627 0.314 0.337 0.890 0.916 0.815 0.824
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 1.12: Dynamic GMM in orthogonal deviations regression of capital investment on past
capital investment, sales, long-term debt, financial payments, acquisition dummy, financial profits
and current and lagged financial investment (total and short-term). Period 1970-2018. P95
sample: Non-IT subsample (left panel) and IT subsample (right panel).
P95 sample
NON-IT SUBSAMPLE IT SUBSAMPLE




















iintant−1 0.524*** 0.645*** 0.611*** 0.646*** 0.666*** 0.534** 0.485*** 0.344** 0.358*** 0.370*
(0.126) (0.107) (0.0781) (0.0986) (0.0804) (0.209) (0.129) (0.164) (0.136) (0.208)
salest−1 0.333*** 0.320*** 0.303*** 0.330*** 0.249*** 0.383*** 0.459*** 0.559*** 0.523*** 0.587***
(0.103) (0.0688) (0.0782) (0.0635) (0.0624) (0.104) (0.0746) (0.0968) (0.0846) (0.111)
debtt−1 0.0131 -0.0111 -0.00923 -0.00753 -0.0189* -0.0195** -0.0255*** -0.0249*** -0.0251*** -0.0238**
(0.0121) (0.00962) (0.00992) (0.00943) (0.0114) (0.00898) (0.00787) (0.00950) (0.00835) (0.00991)
payfint−1 0.0199 0.0421* 0.0261 0.0373* 0.0347 -0.0189 -0.0126 -0.0143 -0.0140 -0.0113
(0.0208) (0.0217) (0.0209) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0185) (0.0153) (0.0190) (0.0168) (0.0224)
ACQt−1 0.00220 -0.0108 -0.0441* -0.0103 -0.0289 0.00632 -0.0251 -0.00422 -0.0162 -0.00528









s.t. ifint−1 0.00788 0.0339***
(0.00743) (0.0116)
N. obs. 1451 2009 1355 2004 1364 1026 1549 1331 1546 1321
N. firms 157 204 166 206 167 114 147 134 147 135
AR(1) test : z1 -2.35 -3.07 -2.67 -3.07 -2.73 -2.78 -3.69 -2.71 -3.23 -2.48
Prob > z1 0.019 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.013
AR(2) test : z2 0.90 1.81 1.35 1.64 1.48 0.73 1.38 0.56 1.03 0.82
Prob > z2 0.369 0.070 0.178 0.100 0.139 0.466 0.169 0.577 0.301 0.412
Sargan test : J1 48.77 58.25 54.34 60.74 58.25 33.70 26.19 26.20 23.23 26.12
Prob > J1 0.287 0.074 0.137 0.048 0.074 0.870 0.985 0.985 0.996 0.985
Hansen test : J2 48.14 44.66 39.77 45.57 45.21 45.53 39.12 41.21 41.32 43.21
Prob > J2 0.309 0.444 0.653 0.406 0.421 0.408 0.680 0.592 0.587 0.505
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
1.7 Conclusions
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter might entail different contributions, a first
one supporting the value oriented view of the overall economy and for monopolists, being
their Surplus Wealth very sensitive to changes in intangible investment (value coming from in-
formation technology and related innovations/exploitation) and dividend payments and stock
buyback in particular and in financial profits in the latter sample (value coming from financial-
ization); a second one providing some insights on the role of financial investment for corpora-
tions, in particular for capital investment decisions (both tangible and intangible) and a last
one that shed some more light on financialization and market power. Results indeed suggest
that firms detecting huge levels of Surplus Wealth (called monopolists) (i) appear to employ
past financial investment/financial profits to increase R&D and advertising expenditure rather
than physical capital investment, whilst the opposite holds for the economy as a whole and
(ii) do not face any trade-off effect between current financial investment and current capital
investment (either tangible or intangible). Further, monopolists operating in the IT sector dis-
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play significant positive coefficients for financial profits, current and past financial assets and
short-term financial investment only concerning intangible investment decisions, while the same
variables are insignificant for physical capital investment decisions (it is quite the opposite in
the case of monopolists not operating in the IT sector). According to this analysis, therefore,
we can not exclude a linkage between the accumulation of financial assets and market power,
given IT monopolists’ tendency to increase R&D and advertising rather than plant, equip-
ment and machineries. The conclusion is not however that financial investment are beneficial
to R&D (intended as a motor of innovation and growth for the overall economy), but rather
that they might be beneficial to the maintainance of the monopolists’ moat (monopoly rents
provided by intangibles), especially in the IT sector and thus detrimental to competition (in
this context, the Surplus Wealth measure might represent an alternative measure to calculate
and study market power). Moreover, for the economy as a whole, although financial profits
seem to positively affect both tangible and intangible capital expenditure, the emergence of
a trade-off between financial assets and capital investment nullifies such positive effect and,
further, raises some more concerns about the financialization of the economy. The trade-off
effect entails two big concerns that we should address: first, it supports the value oriented
view of the economy at the expense of growth (the positive effect of financial profits and past
financial assets/investment are indeed mattified, requiring further investigation) and second,




When Firms Buy Corporate Bonds:
an Agent-Based Approach to Credit
Within Firms in a Schumpeterian
Framework
2.1 Introduction
While the first chapter provided some insights of a possible correlation between R&D and
the rise of financial assets, specifically in the form of corporate bonds, the second chapter tries
to address such correlation in a more theoretical framework. The idea behind this chapter
is to introduce these two features together into a macroeconomic agent-based model, which
allows to manipulate behavioural rules to deal with uncertain frameworks. One purpose is to
introduce some differentiation in capital and this is done by adding intangible capital in a CATS
model1 by means of a capital aggregator. To further circumscribe the analysis, two strong and
simplifying assumptions are made: first, intangible capital is confined to what concerns the IT
and digitalization, such as softwares, platforms, clouds, artificial intelligence and/or databases
involving Big Data (patents in terms of asset value, goodwill or this sort of intangibles are
here ignored), which allows to attach some intrinsic advertising properties to capital; second
and consequently, intangible capital is strongly affected by innovations. The innovation process
is assumed to be endogenous to the system, taking inspiration from Schumpeterian theories,
which are at the roots of the behavioural assumptions on R&D shaping capital producers. Since
the model introduces the accumulation of financial assets by means of bonds’ purchasing, we
want to assess whether their interaction may impact on macroeconomic variables such as GDP
fluctuations and employment in a context of endogenous growth. The great majority of studies
concerning financialization shows evidence about the negative effect it has on the real economy:
1In macroeconomic ABMs, the CATS model is theorized in Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini (2015), while
the K+S model (which will be cited frequently) refers to Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2010). See Dawid and
Delli Gatti (2018) for a complete overview of macro ABMs.
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this work mainly follows this tradition, although the effects of bonds’ purchase is not always
detrimental to growth. Overall, financial assets do not contribute to enhance technological
progress in this specific setting: this is due to credit rationing and the emergence of a possible
trade-off mechanism. Surprisingly, financial fragility is affected only in the best scenario, when
the finance-growth nexus succeeds in fostering growth.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 provides a brief overview of past and recent
literature, with particular attention to models used as reference in this work; section 2.3 exten-
sively illustrates the theoretical model that has been constructed; section 2.4 is dedicated to
simulations and presentation of results. A brief discussion with concluding remarks complete
the chapter.
2.2 Related Literature
AB models have experienced a flourishing period, given their ability to shape behavioural
assumptions and solve the emerging complex related interactions with no closed form solu-
tions. A first summarizing review on macro ABMs, Dawid and Delli Gatti (2018), identifies
eight different families of models and carry a brief but comprehensive illustration of their main
characteristics that helps mapping the main ideas behind those models. Among them, two fam-
ilies of models has been taken as main reference to develop the current chapter. The first one is
the CATS model, in particular, Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini (2015) and Delli Gatti and
Grazzini (2020); while the second one is the K+S model, Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2010).
The former work’s big contribution is related to its ability to replicate autocorrelation patterns
of macroeconomic variables endogenously through the interaction of agents’ adaptive behaviour
in dealing with uncertainty (which transfers memory from individual rules to time series macro
variables), without recurring to an exogenous AR(1) shock, typically used in standard macroe-
conomic models. The introduction of capital good firms, other than further enhancing this
result, can also generate – together with the inclusion of a credit market – GDP fluctuations
and crisis. It is, therefore, stressed the importance of the upstream-downstream mechanism be-
tween firms producing capital good and firms purchasing it to produce consumption good. This
relation, together with the interaction with the financial sector and agents’ bounded rationality,
has an impact on business cycles and on the emergence of crises. In the CATS model, indeed,
financial decisions are clearly linked to investment decisions regarding firms’ capital structure,
with capital assumed to be fixed in the short run. Delli Gatti and Grazzini (2020) extend the
model by introducing a public sector that collects taxes and provides transfers to unemployed
and by proposing a Bayesian estimation technique for the calibration of parameters, to make
an attempt in providing an answer to criticism on the hyper-parametrization of agent-based
models. The issue of initial calibration has been addressed also by Caiani, Godin, Caverzasi,
Gallegati, Kinsella, and Stiglitz (2016), paying particular attention to stock-flow consistency.
They propose a six-step procedure to initialize and homogeneize all agents in a steady state,
in order to get rid of arbitrariness and overcome the problem of biased results due to asym-
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metric initial conditions. Heterogeneity then arises because of their stochastic behaviour and
their interactions make the dynamics of the model emerging. The model is able to replicate
macroeconomic stylized facts (as the pro-cyclicality of investment, consumption and inflation
and the counter-cyclicality of unemployment and mark-ups). One of the main results highlights
how long-run dynamics can be affected by instability because of disproportionate investment
and credit. The model, however is converging to a quasi SS, and the introduction of growth is
addressed in a subsequent and more recent paper, Caiani, Russo, and Gallegati (2019). Prelim-
inary macro AB models regarding fluctuations and growth due to innovation are introduced in
Cincotti, Raberto, and Teglio (2010, 2012), Dawid, Gemkow, Harting, Van der Hoog, and Neu-
gart (2012) and Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2010). In particular, in the K+S model, Dosi,
Fagiolo, and Roventini (2010) shapes technological progress in a Schumpeterian framework,
endogenously generating supply shocks and studying the related effects on the macroeconomy.
The innovation process is built on R&D expenditure and propagates from upstream firms to
downstream firms through the entailed productivity of capital in investment decisions. The
most interesting feature of this work lies exactly on the innovation process design, which is
eventually able to replicate the main macro and micro stylized facts. The Schumpeterian envi-
ronment is well stated, especially for what concerns the entry/exit dynamics, while low effort
appears to have been done for modeling competition among incumbents. Their most impor-
tant result confirm that fiscal policies are necessary in order to sustain the economy and avoid
“bad trajectories” caused by the Schumpeterian mechanism, which in their model is unable to
maintain a self-sustained growth close to full-employment alone. The K+S model links R&D
expenditure of incumbents to past sales in an exogenous manner and leaves the Schumpeterian
mechanism working only through the entry dynamics while effects on technological frontier due
to competition among incumbents is left apart. The latter issue has been addressed specifically
by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) through a Schumpeterian (equilibrium)
growth model which led to the U-shaped relationship between product market competition and
innovation. In what follows, we try to address the Schumpeterian mechanism in a very trivial
way, which, however, replicates the basic ideas of Schumpeter et al. (1939) about innovation
processes. A very strong assumption concerns innovation and investment which are assumed
to involve only intangibles, whose importance have become increasingly relevant over the last
decades (whilst we know that tangible capital accumulation has progressively decreased). As
will be explained throughout the chapter, intangible capital can entail specific IT properties,
especially in the case of artificial intelligence (such as data collecting and algorithms for adver-
tising), which allow us to shape search and matching accordingly – something that cannot be
done with tangible capital. In a very recent paper by Bertani, Ponta, Raberto, Teglio, and Cin-
cotti (2021) we can find the same intuitions regarding intangibles: they consider “software or
any other digitalised knowledge-based assets, e.g., algorithms, advanced routines, instructions”
as a “new class of productive capital”2 and modeled it modeled in an agent-based framework.
However, they follow the EURACE tradition and firms produce according to a Cobb-Douglas
2Bertani, Ponta, Raberto, Teglio, and Cincotti (2021) page 352.
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production function where the factors of productions are labor and tangible capital (and where
the latter is assumed to be an endowment – we will make the same assumption). Eventually,
intangible assets are not conceived as part of capital but enter the production function through
the total factor productivity. Our approach, instead, consists in an attempt of constructing an
firm-level aggregate measure for capital including both physical and intangible capital. About
information technology, a paper by Kurz (2017) highlights how monopoly rents can arise in IT
driven businesses, shedding some light on capital employed by the firm and wealth produced
for its owners. Intangibles are here not assumed to directly create wealth for shareholders
but nevertheless they are supposed to be linked with market power exactly through the data
collecting mechanism. Apart from monopoly rents stemming from IT, modern-days companies
can also enjoy other types of rents that can have an impact on their wealth: rents coming from
the financial sector. An interesting empirical study of Duchin, Gilbert, Harford, and Hrdlicka
(2017) confirms that a substantial percentage of corporations’ liquidity is composed of financial
risky assets, among which the 23,6% represent corporate bonds. Although the phenomenon is
still minor, it is worth of attention. Also a recent OECD study, Çelik, Demirtas, and Isaksson
(2020), has highlighted some important features concerning corporate bonds’ trends. First of
all, the corporate debt market is increasing in size, globally reaching the $13,5 trillion record
in 2019. Second, in the last years the bond market has been dominated by low quality, BBB
rated newly issued bonds, while a growing portion ranging from 20% in 2010 to 25% in 2019 is
occupied by junk bonds (non-investment grade bonds)3; moreover, issuers have increased their
leverage ratios over the last ten years. Third, since 2009 non-financial companies have became
important bondholders, although the financial sector still remains the major holder4.“Between
2009 and 2018, the combined value of corporate bond holdings by 25 large non-financial US
companies tripled from USD 119 billion to USD 356 billion. The company with the largest port-
folio alone held USD 124 billion in corporate debt securities. This equals the combined holdings
of the world’s 6 largest corporate bond ETFs (exchange traded funds)”5. In 2018, indeed, US
corporate bonds were held by insurance and pension funds for 49%, investment funds for 28%
and by non-financial corporations for 13%6. The increase in corporate bonds’ holding by (large)
non-financial corporations (through foreign subsidiaries) occurred after the 2008 financial crisis.
In most cases, the percentage of corporate bonds over investment portfolio grew with respect to
one decade ago, reaching also peaks above 50% (e.g. Apple, Cisco, Oracle and Cigna. Google
and Facebook are around 20%, while Amazon only the 10%. Curiously, Microsoft actually
inverted the trend.)7. How this new financialization phenomenon is affecting (and will affect)
the economy is still unclear: financial assets seem to have a controversial effect on capital in-
vestment (financial profits appear to be beneficial for new investment in both physical capital
3Greenwood and Hanson (2013) use the ratio between non-investment grade bonds’ issuance and total
corporate bonds’ issuance to calculate the excess corporate bond returns.
4Monetary financial institutions, insurance and pension funds, investment funds and others.
5Çelik, Demirtas, and Isaksson (2020) pg. 6.
6See Çelik, Demirtas, and Isaksson (2020) Table 14 pg. 21.
7See Çelik, Demirtas, and Isaksson (2020) Table 22 pg. 33.
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and intangible capital, whilst current financial investment decisions crowd them out8). Exist-
ing financialization literature involving ABMs involves the modelling of more broadly studied
financialization phenomena, such as the shareholders’ value orientation of corporations: Dawid,
Harting, and van der Hoog (2019) for example show how managers’ share based remuneration
negatively impact on productivity and wages, also through investors expectations that boost
share prices and further increase managers’ remuneration; Guerini, Harting, and Napoletano
(2020)) adds that share repurchase is itself the outcome of increasing stock based remunera-
tion, confirming the slowdown in technical progress when firms’ governance structure leaves
room to short-term investors. Although these studies highlight the importance of including
heterogeneity among firms’ employees (workers vs. managers) and firms’ ownership, stressing
the negative role that managers’ share based remuneration scheme have on the real economy,
we left it apart for the moment for two main reasons: (i) the model here presented is quite
complex, so that we preferred to remain stick to the basic CATS model, which does not pose
ownership problems (there is one owner per firm) neither entails differences among workers;
(ii) we want to focus on the effects of firms being investors and thus analyze a financialization
mechanism that does not include broadly studied phenomena as share buybacks and managers’
remuneration. Rather, this chapter tries to enrich existing literature on the finance-growth
nexus using macro ABMs, where corporations become creditors next to banks. As far as we
know, no paper has been produced to investigate this financialization channel, neither much
empirical investigation has been done so far. The relationship between credit and growth in
ABM context has been addressed by Fagiolo, Giachini, and Roventini (2020), but only concern-
ing bank credit. The model confirms the ability of finance in fostering technological progress,
but also shed some light on growth criticalities arising from excessive credit. We want to check
whether such conclusions change when not only banks but also companies give credit through
bonds’ purchasing. As far as we are concerned, an ABM has been created for bonds’ trading
(Braun-Munzinger, Liu, and Turrell (2018)). In our model, however, bonds are not assumed to
be traded (therefore we will not observe bonds’ price movements) and only firms can take on
the role of investors: we want to see what happens when corporations buy corporate bonds.
2.3 Theretical Model
2.3.1 The Model’s Environment
The model is composed of households, firms, Government and one bank only. Households
-who consume the homogeneous consumption good- are divided into workers, who provide labor
to firms and receive labor income, and capitalists, who receive dividend income. The latter own
firms (there is one capitalist per firm) and recapitalize them if bankruptcy occurs. Firms are
also divided into consumption good firms (downstream or c-firms) and capital good producers
(upstream or k-firms), but in order to focus the analysis on intangibles only, physical capital,
8In Orhangazi (2008) financial profits do not have a clear effect on tangible capital expenditure: overall the
variable seems to be irrelevant, but turns negative and significant for large firms, whilst positive for small firms.
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Kphy, is treated as an endowment (and therefore is not produced), while intangible capital, K,
is produced by k-firms, which perform R&D9. R&D expenditure is the only firms’tool to engage
in an innovation processes, which is here shaped in a Schumpeterian framework, where new
entrants have advantages/disadvantages with respect to incumbents (as in Dosi, Fagiolo, and
Roventini (2010)) and where firms decide the intensity of their R&D effort on the basis of (i)
their position relative to the technological frontier, (ii) the entry threat and (iii) competition
among incumbents –which is a novelty in AB models dealing with technological progress. If
a k-firm does not have enough liquidity to finance its research and/or production processes,
it can look for external financing in the form of bank loans and new bonds’ issuance. Bonds
are bought by liquid firms operating in the other sector10 seeking for additional profits. Both
types of firms can be credit rationed and, according to their ability to repay debt, they are
classified into Minskian hedge, speculative or Ponzi units. If a firm is in a Ponzi position, it is
assumed to go bankrupt, while a speculative position allows to re-negotiate debt. The second
way a firm can go bankrupt is through negative equity, as usual. Financial fragility plays a
crucial role in determining the cost of debt and if bankruptcy occurs, new firms, recapitalized
by capitalists, enter the market such that we end up having a dynasty of firms (i.e. the number
of firms is fixed). The labor market, the consumption-good market, the bonds’ market and the
capital-good market are governed by search and matching mechanism. Firms in both sectors
are assumed not to know their demand curve and to have some market power (prices are set
according to a mark-up rule) in their local market. Finally, workers are assumed to be all the
same, meaning that skills play no role in this model and they are paid a wage uniform across
firms in the same sector (the wage rate changes according to labor productivity growth – which
depends on innovation – in the respective sector). For simplicity, unemployed workers accept
the first job they are offered. Innovation has an impact on workers through increased labor
productivity. The sequence of events is summarized as follows:
1. At the end of the period, on the basis of two market signals, i.e. inventories and average
price of the consumption/capital good, c-firms and k-firms set their desired levels of
production. At the beginning of each period, then, c-firms set their labor demand on the
basis of their desired level of output. They also set the level of investment in intangible
capital. K-firms, instead, discover whether they can access innovation or not. Labor
demand of k-firms is determined on the basis of desired production and R&D effort
(which constitutes in wages paid to researchers) set at the end of the previous period. If
firms do not have enough internal funds to finance research/investment and production,
they ask for external finance in the form of bank loans and/or newly issued bonds.
2. The bank extends loans to k-firms and c-firms and liquid firms buy bonds from bonds’
9In this preliminary work, despite the presence of the public sector, basic research and its spillover effects
are left apart.
10C-firms buy bonds issued by k-firms or vice-versa, because it is not reasonable to assume that companies
in the same sector buy each others’ bonds: k-firms have no interest in investing in other k-firms innovations
stemming from R&D because they do not employ capital but only labor; c-firms have no clue in financing
competitors’ production, since the good is homogeneous.
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issuers. Once they receive credit, c-firms and k-firms go on the labor market. The
government pays subsidies to unemployed. C-firms start producing Yi,t with employed
workers and available capital stock, while k-firms produce Kj,t and discover whether the
innovation has been a success or a failure.
3. The search and matching mechanism takes place and c-firms sell their consumption good
to consumers, while k-firms sell their intangible capital good to c-firms. Capital good sold
will be available for use next period.
4. At the end of the period, firms have to pay interests, return principal repayments and
pay taxes. Dividends follow. If equity turns negative or the firm is in a Ponzi position, it
goes bankrupt and is replaced by a new firm. Surviving k-firms and new k-entrants set
their level of R&D effort according to Schumpeterian rules.
2.3.2 Households
In order to overcome the issue of ownership rights to be attributed to heterogeneous house-
holds owning firms and supplying labor, following Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini (2015),
households are divided into capitalists, f = (1, 2, .., F ), and workers, h = (1, 2, .., H). The lat-
ter provide units of labor to k-firms and c-firms receiving labor income, wf,t, and consume the
homogeneous consumption-good produced by c-firms. Labor income is uniform across agents
employed in the same sector but evolves in time according to labor productivity growth in each
sector11. Capitalists instead, own firms: at t=1, each capitalist is randomly assigned one firm
(either c-firm or k-firm), which he will own from that moment onward. Capitalists’ income,
therefore, consists in dividends paid by the firm he owns: τDivπf,t, with τ
Div ∈ (0, 1) being
the dividend payout ratio and πf,t firms’ profits. For the sake of simplicity, capitalists also
recapitalize a new firm when a bankrupt firm exits the market. Households’ income will be
therefore:
Yc,t =
wf,t if c = hτDivπafter taxf,t−1 if c = f (2.1)
If a worker is unemployed, he visits randomly Ze firms and accepts the first job offer he finds
12.
If any of the Ze firms has no open vacancy, he remains unemployed and use his dis-savings for
consumption. If a worker becomes unemployed in period t, he starts looking for another job
in the same period. There are no firing costs for firms and unemployed workers are economi-
cally sustained by Government subsidies. Consumption is determined in a bounded rationality
11This choice is motivated by the fact that by keeping the wage rate uniform across agents in both sectors,
due to technology specification of c-firms, the increase in labor productivity in the c-sector is much lower with
respect to the increase in the wage rate (which is pushed by a faster labor productivity growth in the k-sector).
This causes a linear increase in unit labor costs for c-firms and, at the same time, a decrease in unit labor costs
for k-firms. For this reason, the wage rate has been diversified for the two different sectors.
12Since firms belonging to different sectors offer different wages, one could add a preferential mechanism
related to individual reservation wage.
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setting as follows:
Cc,t = Ȳc,t + χMc,t (2.2)
where future expected income is proxied by Ȳc,t, human wealth
13, while Mc,t = Mc,t−1+Yc,t−Cc,t
represents households’ financial wealth, deposited at the bank. The interest rate on deposits
is nil and if households do not receive any income financial wealth is de-cumulated to keep
consuming14. According to the search and matching mechanism, each household can visit Zc
selected c-firms and buys from the ranked c-firms charging the lowest prices until his consump-
tion budget is over. If this does not happen and the consumer does not spend everything after
visiting all the selected number of c-firms, he puts his involuntary savings into deposits.
2.3.3 The Production Sector
Profit maximization is ruled out in the production sector: firms do not know their actual
demand schedule and therefore they cannot calculate their marginal revenue function. The
production sector, hence, is characterized by imperfect information, which allows to model pro-
duction and pricing decisions in a boundedly rational way: desired production is set according
to market feedbacks such as excess demand/supply (i.e. involuntary inventories) and average
price, while pricing change according to a simple rule of a variable mark-up over unit labor
costs. Two considerations follow: (i) the variable mark-up is able to capture changes in the
market share of each firm but even if firms can behave monopolistically in their local market,
they tend not to run away from average prices and (ii) if a firm’s mark-up causes a price fall
below its average costs, the firm is forced to set a price equal to average costs.
K-firms
Since tangible capital is assumed to be constant and uniform across c-firms, capital-good
firms, j = (1, 2, ..., J), only produce intangible capital goods to be sold to consumption-good
firms by means of labor only. Intangible capital is a source of heterogeneity in this model, given
that it can entail different levels of capital productivities Aj,t, stemming from innovation.
Mainly following the status quo process of CATS models15, at the end of each period, each k-
firm observes the average price of intangible capital pκt and the level of involuntary inventories
(i.e. the forecasting error) ∆κj,t = Kj,t − KDj,t, where KDj,t represents actual demand. These
two signals will be used to formulate the level of desired output, K∗j,t+1. If the forecasting
error is positive, it means that the j-th k-firm was expecting higher sales and hence there is
excess supply. If it is negative, the j-th k-firm has underestimated demand giving rise to excess
demand. No forecasting error means that demand=supply, i.e. there is equilibrium in the
capital goods market. Positive involuntary inventories are stored and are assumed to fully
13see Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini (2015): Ȳc,t = ξ
hwȲc,t−1 +(1−ξhw)Yc,t, being ξhw ∈ (0, 1) a memory
parameter.
14From permanent income hypothesis
15In particular, Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini (2015) and Delli Gatti and Grazzini (2020), which define
the status quo as the pair of firm’s price and current production (Pf,t, Yf,t).
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depreciate after one year. The value of capital inventories is calculated based on their unit
production costs and, for tractability motives, it is also assumed that stored capital inventories
can be converted into more productive capital at zero costs in case a new innovation occurs





j,t. The fact that the firm has to rely on market signals to fix production is a way to
deal with uncertainty about the actual demand schedule. The final aim of k-firms is that of
minimizing the forecasting error. Depending on the two market signals ∆κj,t and p
κ
t , k-firms can
decide to change either the price charged either the quantity to produce16, so they set a level
of desired production at the level of expected demand minus stored inventories, ivtj,t−1:
K∗j,t+1 = K
e
j,t+1 − ivtj,t−1 =
(Kj,t + νK(∆j,t))− ivtj,t−1, if ∆j,t ≤ 0 and pκj,t > pκt(Kj,t − νK(∆j,t))− ivtj,t−1, if ∆j,t > 0 and pκj,t < pκt
Concerning prices, a novelty with respect to the CATS model is introduced in the status quo
process in order to harmonize it with the majority of macro ABMs: given that the k-sector (as
the c-sector) is assumed not to be perfectly competitive: each k-firm behaves as a monopolist




for prices, thus, takes an explicit form:
pκj,t+1 = (1 + µ
κ
j,t+1)ucj,t+1 (2.3)
In case of (i) excess demand and excessively low prices, and (ii) excess supply and prices above
average price, k-firms can reset their price (and not desired production) by increasing/decreasing

















where FNk is randomly taken period to period and for each different k-firm from a Folded
Normal distribution with parameters (µFNk , σ
2
FNk
). The above formulation for prices allows
to make distinctions between possible gains tied to market power, captured by the mark-up
and those due to lower unit labor costs, which decrease as individual firms’ labor productivity
increases as a consequence of technological progress.
Production of the Capital Good




16See Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini (2015), who also cite Bhaskar, Machin, and Reid (1993) and
Kawasaki, McMillan, and Zimmermann (1982) to empirically support this price/quantity decision rules.
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where aκj,t is the labor productivity parameter for k-firms. Notice that unit labor costs differ
from firm to firm uniquely in the labor productivity: as aj,t increases after successful innova-
tion/imitation, the unit labor cost decreases. Labor productivity, hence, does not depend on
employees’ skills (which are left apart here), but on the j-th k-firm position on the technological
frontier. Firms with similar labor productivity are said to be neck-and-neck, since they also
have similar unit labor costs17.
The Innovation Process
At the end of the period, k-firms set their desired level of R&D for next period:
RDj,t+1 = zj,tπj,t (2.5)
This formulation is very similar to that of Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2010), that, however,
link R&D expenditure to past sales with a fixed fraction z. Here the intensity of R&D effort, zj,t,
is assumed to be variable and proportional to profits (to allow financial profits to have a direct
impact on R&D). The amount of desired R&D expenditure is then split between innovation
and imitation, as in Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2010):
INj,t+1 = εRDj,t+1 (2.6)
IMj,t+1 = (1− ε)RDj,t+1 (2.7)
Obviously, if a k-firm is at the frontier, all R&D resources will be used to further innovate (i.e
ε = 1). R&D expenditure is fully used to pay researchers the uniform sectorial wage. Access to
innovation/imitation is governed by a Bernoulli process, with probability parameters θIN , θIM .
These probabilities depend on the amount of R&D a firm has set at the end of the previous
period. Indeed, it is important to stress the fact that when they set the level of R&D, k-firms
do not know whether they will have access to innovation or not during next period, but they
know that the probabilities θINj,t and θ
IM
j,t of entering the innovation and imitation processes,
respectively, depend on the level of R&D they choose. Such parameters are thus designed in a
way that guarantees higher likelihood to innovate/imitate as firms spend in R&D (as in K+S
literature):
θINj,t = 1− e−ζ
1
j,tINj,t (2.8)
θIMj,t = 1− e−ζ
2
j,tIMj,t (2.9)
with 0 < ζ1,2j,t ≤ 1 being two parameters representing learning of incumbents, which in the
present work is assumed to be endogenous, increasing as new innovations/imitations take place
and decreasing with time if no innovation occurs. This approach represents a novelty with
17The expression is taken from Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) and will be of some
practical use for the Schumpeterian mechanism later on.
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j,t − aκj,t−1))e−∆t(1/15) (2.10)
with HV being the Heaviside step function, which assigns value 1 if labor productivity stem-
ming from the innovation/imitation process has improved, 1/2 if it is the same as the previous
period one and 0 if it has worsened18. Equation (10) crucially determine (i) individual access to
innovation/imitation for each k-firm (the higher the learning parameter, the higher the likeli-
hood to access the process) and (ii) on aggregate, barriers to entry. Conceptually following Dosi,
Fagiolo, and Roventini (2010), the cumulative learning of incumbents influences new entrants’
dynamics. The way in which the evolution of the ζ1,2j,t parameter determines the advantage
or disadvantage of new entrants vs. incumbents, can be illustrated only after discussing the
second step of the innovation process of incumbents. Once the j-th k-firm has had access to
the process, research takes place and reveals through entailed productivities:
A
IN/IM





j,t−1(1 + xj,t) (2.12)
where the variable xj,t is randomly drawn from a Beta(αx, βx) distribution over the support
[x, x̄]). K-firms then compare the entailed productivity of capital after innovation and/or
imitation with their previous entailed productivity of intangible capital and choose to produce
the one with the highest value. If an innovation is successful, indeed, the resulting entailed
productivities are higher that the previous ones and innovative capital produced will entail





otherwise the old productivity is preserved. Back to the Schumpeterian mechanism, if the
cumulative new learning stemming from the innovation process of incumbents increases, there
will be higher cumulative advantage of incumbents and new entrants will face higher entry
barriers: the disadvantage of new entrants with respect to incumbents is modeled by shifting
the Beta distribution rightward when new firms (replacing bankrupted ones) are initialized,
whilst the advantage of new entrants is given by shifting the Beta distribution leftward. As a
further implementation of the K+S model – which applies the Schumpeterian mechanism only
to the dynamics concerning entry and exit – consider now the dynamics among incumbents.
To frame this environment, take the intensity of R&D effort, zj,t ∈ [0, 1], and endogeneize it as
well. At the end of period k-firms know:
 their distance to the frontier, DFj,t: how far a firm’s output is from the technological
frontier (i.e. the ratio between the productivity embodied into the j-th k-firm’s produced
capital and the one embodied in the most innovative capital produced in the economy);
 the level of product-market competition, PMCj,t: what is the level of competition among
18If labor productivity worsens during the innovation/imitation process, the firm will consider that innovation
as a failure and keep the previous one with its previous level of labor productivity.
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incumbents (i.e. are there neck-and-neck firms?);
 next period entry threat: can potential new entrants be an effective threat to last inno-
vators? .
These three ingredients constitute the basis of the complete Schumpeterian framework on which
beliefs on zj,t are constructed. The story is as follows: a firm is willing to innovate if it can
attain post-innovation monopoly rents. As well explained by Aghion and Howitt (2006), these
will depend on (i) product-market competition among incumbents (PMC) and (ii) the threat
represented by potential new entrants, represented for simplicity by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index for market concentration (high levels of market concentration allow k-innovators to relax
the new entrants’ threat). New entrants enter with the average market productivities, updated
according to a random draw from a Beta distribution, whose parameters are shifted period to
period according to whether they are in a position of advantage or disadvantage. They also
set their R&D effort as a benchmark fraction z̄ of their liquidity19. Concerning PMCj,t: for
the sake of simplicity, assume that k-firms know incumbents’ labor productivities: when two
or more k-incumbents have similar unit labor costs, there is product market competition (high
neck-and-neckness). A crucial issue at this point is to determine each firm’s distance to the
frontier in order to be able to assess the different prevailing effects which influence k-firms’




j,t } as the





represent j-th k-firm’s distance to the frontier, similar to Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti
(2006). A value of DFj,t = 1 means that the j-th k-firm is on the technological frontier (i.e.
there is no distance). As DFj,t falls below unity, the distance to the frontier increases. Having
all ingredients, the Schumpeterian framework is now simplified as follows:
CASE 1: for DFj,t = 1:
1a) No PMC implies that efforts in R&D will be low: incumbent innovators do not
look for drastic innovations to escape competition, since they are currently enjoying
monopolistic profits and have no neck-and-neck competitors. Their aim is, at max-
imum, to implement future innovaitons to make the appropriability effect to last in
time. This is true for low entry threats. The intensity of R&D effort is minimum
and equal to the benchmark level: zj,t = z̄.
1b) If competition among incumbents is still nil but the entry threat is relevant, then the
innovator will enhance R&D efforts to make drastic innovations and escape entry21.
The intensity of R&D effort can double the benchmark level: zj,t ∈ (z̄, 2z̄).
19New entrants do not have profits.
20Amaxj,t is the maximum entailed productivity among all k-firms which innovated in period t.
21Entry will take place in any case, but new entrants will face a disadvantage.
50
1c) If the entry threat is still important and the firm has many neck-and-neck com-
petitors (because for example the innovation has not gone too far from the previous
frontier), efforts to increase R&D will be substantial in order to both escape competi-
tion and escape entry. The intensity of R&D effort can again double the benchmark
level: zj,t ∈ (z̄, 2z̄).
1d) If there is PMC and the entry threat is low, the escape competition effect dominates
and k-firms try to increase R&D to make drastic innovations and gain a monopolistic
position. The intensity of R&D effort can again double the benchmark level: zj,t ∈
(z̄, 2z̄).
CASE 2: for DFj,t < 1
2a) and 2d) Irrespective of PMC, k-firms try to reach the innovator and engage in drastic R&D
only if the entry threat is nil. The escape competition effect works among non-
innovator incumbents to catch the technological frontier. The intensity of R&D
effort can double the benchmark level: zj,t ∈ (z̄, 2z̄).
2b) and 2c) If there is a high entry threat, the discouragement effect rules out R&D efforts due
to the fact that new entrants will be endowed with a close to frontier technology (i.e.
new entrants’ workers have high labor productivity). The intensity of R&D effort
takes its lowest values, with a minimum of 0: zj,t ∈ (0, z̄).
To sum up, at the end of the period k-firms receive signals on their distance to the frontier, on
PMCj,t and on entry threat; they get to know which effect is going to dominate and decide
the intensity of the R&D effort, zj,t, accordingly. In case the j-th k-firm is on the frontier, its
behaviour will be the one described in CASE 1; whilst if the j-th k-incumbent is not on the
frontier it will behave as in CASE 2:
CASE 1: DFj,t = 1
PMC
1d) Drastic R&D 1c) Drastic R&D









CASE 2: DFj,t < 1
PMC




2a) Drastic R&D 2b) No R&D
escape competition discouragement
No PMC
Search and Matching for K-firms
Once the capital good market opens, c-firms willing to invest visit their previous seller22
and a fixed number Zk of k-firms. The probability of being visited is higher for k-firms close
to the frontier and lower for those far from the frontier and is calculated using a logistic
probability function: prvisitj,t = 1/(1 + e
bj,t(0.5−DFj,t)). The introduction of the probability of
being visited can be motivated by assuming that successful R&D efforts are accompanied by
any sort of advertising (especially in the IT sector) or are simply “followed” by c-firms interested
in buying innovative intangible capital, thus enlarging the platform of potential clients (bj,t has
higher values for innovators). Visited firms are then ranked according to a subjective measure
of attractiveness, similarly to Caiani, Russo, and Gallegati (2019): given the charged price of
capital and the expected unit cost associated to the intangible capital that the i-th c-firm would
face if it acquires it, MA = (ucei,t + pj,t). If the new potential seller’s measure of attractiveness










, if MAnew < MAold
0, otherwise
If the supply of the chosen k-firm is not enough to cover c-firm’s planned investment, the i-th
c-firm will buy also from the second-ranked k-firm, and so on. In case the number of firms to be
visited is over and the i-th c-firm still has some unsatisfied demand for intangible capital (i.e.
the actual capital stock purchased will be lower than planned investment), the corresponding
amount of budget is saved.
22This preferential attachment is added to allow for some customer fidelization.
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C-firms
Price and quantity decisions in the c-sector are very similar to those of k-firms: c-firms look
at the two market signals, the forecasting error, ∆i,t, and the average price of the consumption
good, pt and they decide the quantity to produce by setting desired production, Y
∗
i,t+1, to the level
of expected demand. Differently from k-firms, c-firms are not assumed to store their inventories.
C-firms, hence, set their desired quantity to be produced according to the following adaptive
rule:
Y ∗i,t+1 = Y
e
i,t+1 =
Yi,t + νY (−∆i,t), if ∆i,t ≤ 0 and pi,t > ptYi,t − νY (∆i,t), if ∆i,t > 0 and pi,t < pt
where νY ∈ (0, 1). As in the k-sector, current production Yi,t may be different depending on
credit: if the firm incurs in credit rationing when trying to finance production externally, then
current production will differ from desired production. Moreover, due to adjustment costs,
investment cannot potentially occur in any period and c-firms cannot invest any time they
need more capital to produce the desired quantity. The rate of capital utilization is adjusted in
every period depending on the desired quantity to be produced and the actual stock of capital23.
Prices are set as a mark-up over unit labor costs ci,t =
wi,t
ai,t
, where the variable mark-up evolves











, if ∆i,t > 0 and pi,t > pt
where, again, FNc is a random number picked from a folded normal distributions with param-
eters (µFNc , σ
2
FNc
). Prices are set accordingly:
pi,t+1 = (1 + µi,t+1)ci,t+1 (2.14)
The price set, however, cannot be lower than average costs (which now include the cost of
capital) and since there is an implicit competition à la Bertrand shaped by the search and
matching mechanism, c-firms are forced to set prices not too far from the average price, if they
want to avoid consumers switching to other competitors selling at lower prices.
Production of the Consumption Good
Each c-firm is endowed with a constant amount of physical capital Kphy and buys only
intangible capital good from k-firms, to produce the homogeneous consumption good by means
of labor and capital in fixed proportions24. C-firms thus have a Leontief technology, which, at
23See Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini (2015) for details and examples.
24We could have ignored physical capital and simply included only intangible capital in the production
function. However, we wanted to introduce a timid attempt to deal with both tangible and intangible capital,
since we believe that the time to address a broader definition of capital is at hand for economists: looking only
at (the decreasing) physical capital stock or at physical capital expenditure, leaves a great portion of the story
(rising intangible stock) untold
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full capacity, takes the form:
Ŷi,t = min{ai,tNi,t, κ̄i,tKcesi,t } (2.15)
where the productivity of capital, κ̄i,t, linearly shapes labor productivity ai,t = l ∗ κ̄i,t (l is the









with bphy and brd representing the tangible and intangible, respectively, capital factor distri-
bution (positive) parameters (bphy + brd = 1) and ρ being the parameter associated with the
elasticity of substitution, σ = 1
1−ρ . Since tangible capital and intangible capital are assumed
to have a weak substitutability, perfect complementarity and unitary substitutability are ruled
out and σ ∈ (0, 1) is imposed. Now, we know that intangibles entail certain levels of capital
productivities, Aj,t, so that, when a c-firm buys intangible capital, this additional stock with
its entailed productivity is added to the current stock and the weighted average of intangible
























The rate of capital utilization is used to adjust the capital stock to production: if capital needed
to produce the desired quantity is greater than the stock of capital, Kcesi,t , and therefore Ki,t will
be used at full capacity; otherwise, the rate of capacity utilization will be adjusted accordingly.
The labor requirement is Ni,t =
κ̄i,t
ai,t
Ki,t. Intangible capital depreciates through time; therefore
its law of motion is:
Ki,t+1 = (1− urdi,tδ)Ki,t + Ii,t (2.19)
with urdi,tδ the actual depreciation rate
27. Ii,t is intangible-capital investment.
Intangible Capital Investment
For simplicity, investment in intangible capital follows the CATS framework for capital in-
vestment, so that it allows c-firms to adjust their capital stock. Investment in intangibles entail,
however a key property in this framework: it is assumed that intangibles used in production
25see Sato (1967).
26Since the main interest of this chapter concerns innovations regarding intangibles, I assumed a productivity
parameter for physical capital constant and uniform across c-firms and set it equal to 1, so that the growth
rate of physical capital productivity is nil. This is the reason why the productivity of tangible capital does not




ρ is the rate of capacity utilization of intangible capital.
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have important IT features, so that they can be softwares, data or knowledge that by means of
algorithms and artificial intelligence can capture consumer preferences and shape consumption.
Given that the consumption good is homogeneous, this simply translates into higher advertis-
ing (through IT and hence intangibles) and therefore higher probability of being visited in the
search and matching mechanism, as will be explained in a while. So, by assumption, it follows
that c-firms buying innovative intangibles can reach more consumers. C-firms also face adjust-
ment costs (so that each c-firm can invest only once every two periods, i.e. the probability of
investing is γ) and intangible capital is fixed in the short run (indeed, capital purchased in t
is available from t+1). The only difference concerns the fact that intangibles are part of the
capital aggregator and must be treated accordingly. Each c-firm calculates the average stock
of capital used until period t according to the following adaptive rule:
K̄cesi,t−1 = ξ
κK̄cesi,t−2 + (1− ξκ)ucesi,t−1Kcesi,t−1 (2.20)
with ξκ ∈ (0, 1) being a memory parameter. The weighted average of past utilized capital with
exponentially decaying weights, K̄cesi,t−1, is then divided by a long run rate of capacity utilization




There are two different main reasons why c-firms want to hold some stock buffer: (i) to face
unexpected demand and (ii) for strategic reasons (excess capacity as deterrent to entry). In
this preliminary model, however, there is no room for endogenous and strategic treatment of
the capacity utilization rate, although it would be an interesting extension. Given the capital
aggregator and being tangible capital fixed (no depreciation), the stock of desired intangible









Intangible capital is subject to depreciation, so that, to replace worn out intangible capital, the
i-th c-firm needs: δ
γ







Search and Matching for C-firms
The c-sector is ruled by a different search and matching mechanism with respect to the
one for the k-sector: the number of firms that each consumer can visit, Zc, is fixed to 2 to
ensure Bertrand competition, but the firms consumers visit change in each period (no fideliza-
tion mechanism). Again, the probability of visiting the i-th c-firm increases with the quality
(measured by the average productivity of capital) of innovative capital of c-firms: c-firms at the
frontier or close to the frontier (i.e. they have innovative intangibles) have higher probabilities
of being visited with respect of those far from the frontier because of enhanced advertising
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properties of newly acquired innovative intangibles28. C-firms that invested in innovative in-
tangibles, then, might have broader local markets because of information technology intrinsic
properties (and related data collecting and advertising). Once selected, households can collect
information on the price of the consumption good and rank them. They buy from the firm
charging the lowest price and keep buying according to their ranking until (i) their income is
over or (ii) there is no more c-firm to be visited. In that case savings are deposited at the bank.
2.3.4 The Credit Market
Assume the pecking order theory to hold, then firms initially finance themselves through
internal funds (i.e. accumulated liquidity, Mf,t−1) and if a financing gap arises, they look for
external financing in the form of bank credit and bonds’ issuance (in this framework there is
no room for new equity issuance given we are interested in the effect of bonds’ issuance and
purchasing). For c-firms the financing gap is given by the difference (if positive) between wages





t−1Ii,t −Mi,t−1 , 0
}
(2.23)






Ff,t therefore represent firms’ credit demand. The supply side of the credit market is composed
of the banking sector and of a number of investing firms.
The Banking Sector
For the sake of simplicity, there is only one bank representing the entire banking sector
and since its behaviour remains unchanged with respect to Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini
(2015) and Delli Gatti and Grazzini (2020), only some key equations are here reported. The
single bank in this economy collects firms’ and households’ deposits and supplies loans to both
c-firms and k-firms. The credit line might be lower than the amount asked by the firm and





Ei,t + Li,t +Bci,t
(2.25)
28The logistic probability already defined for the k-sector’s search and matching mechanism is applied also in
the c-sector.
29A measure of financial fragility that takes into account the ”borrowers’ actual ability to generate net cash
inflows to honor the debt”, as pointed out in Caiani, Godin, Caverzasi, Gallegati, Kinsella, and Stiglitz (2016),
should be preferred. However, since the banking sector is entirely taken from Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini
(2015) and since we already had to introduce the bonds’ market in the credit market, we decided to keep their






Ej,t + Lj,t +Bkj,t
(2.26)
where Lf,t are liabilities in the form of bank loans, Ef,t is equity and B
c,k
f,t are firms’ issued





Bankruptcy can occur in two ways: (i) when equity turns negative due to persistent losses and
(ii) when firms are in a Ponzi position (in order to avoid persistent negative liquidity). Financial
position of firms follow Minsky’s classification and a firm is defined to be hedge, when it can
afford both interests and principal repayments using its actual liquidity30; speculative, when it
can afford only interest payments and need to look for more loans in order to face principal
repayments; and Ponzi, if it cannot repay the entire debt and must incur in new debt in order
to cover at least interest payments. To simplify things to the maximum extent, I assume that,
while speculative firms can re-negotiate their debt in order to repay at least bonds’ principal,
Ponzi firms – unable to repay even interests and/or coupons – are not allowed to ask for new
bank loans in order to cover interest and bonds’ payments and hence go bankrupt. Speculative
positions, thereby, do not have negative consequences on investors, who eventually receive both
coupons and principal repayments because the bank provides to the partial or total bond’s
payment and increases firm’s debt accordingly. Speculative position thus can only generate
bank loans’ repayments delays. Ponzi positions instead give rise to losses: coupons and bonds’
repayments remain unpaid causing a loss of liquidity to investing firms and banks will register
a loss as well in terms of interests and loan repayment, although it takes the bankrupted firm’s
remained liquidity. Formally, we have that:









































, while the interest applied to









being r the risk-free rate and the inverse of the bankruptcy probability being the time to default;
φL is the fraction of bank loans Lf,t = Lf,t−1 + ∆Lf,t to be repaid in each period, with new
loans exerted being the minimum between firm’s fraction of financing gap it wants to cover
with bank loans and the maximum credit the bank is willing to grant (in the latter case there
30Before dividends.
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will be credit rationing on the banking side):
∆Lf,t = min((1− xb)Ff,t, F̄f,t) (2.29)
For all details regarding Eq.( 2.28) and Eq.( 2.29), refer to Assenza, Delli Gatti, and Grazzini
(2015)). Coupon rates, iBf,t and bonds issued, B
(c,κ)
f,t that need to be repaid are addressed in the
next section. Finally, bank’s dividends are equally distributed to capitalists.
Market for Bonds
Firms looking for external financing set the fraction of financing gap they want to cover
with new bonds’ issuance, xbFf,t, with x
b ∈ [0, 1] being constant and uniform across firms31.
Suppose that firms can invest a fraction of past internal funds τBMf,t−1 into other sector’s
firms’ bonds. Also the fraction τB is set to be constant and uniform across c-firms. This
amount is then used to buy government bonds in fraction xGov, and corporate bonds32. Only
firms with excess liquidity, able to carry production with no need of external financing, and
with non-negative past profits are assumed to have access to financial investments. In order to
keep the focus on corporate bonds, Government bonds are assumed to be sold at the end of
period, after having received interests33. Concerning borrowers, the rate of return on bonds,
iBf , is predetermined at the time of issuance and reflects k-firm’s financial position. In this
preliminary work, expectations are left apart and no secondary market is assumed, so that c-
firms are forced to hold all bonds they have purchased ’til maturity and there is no discrepancy
between the bond yield and the coupon rate (i.e. the interest rate set on bonds remains the
same through the holding period). It follows that the price of a bond cannot fluctuate and
corresponds to its par value and since it cannot be exchanged, investors have no possibility of
realizing capital gains. The bond must be fully repaid after four periods34.
Issuance of Bonds (Demand Side)
The f-th firm issues a total value of bonds ∆BFf,t = x
bFf,t, at constant par value, B
pv,
uniform across firms, such that NBf,t = ∆B
F
f,t(B
pv)−1 is the total number of bonds issued in
the market with nBf,t = (1, 2, ..N
B
f,t). Firms belonging to the other sector will buy a discrete







i,t ≤ NBf,t and the inequality is strict, the f-th issuer will collect less financing
than planned on the market (and there will be credit rationing on the financial market side).
Firms fix the coupon rate on bonds iBf,t, which eventually leads to the coupon to be paid in
31Data on US corporations collected on FRED website suggest that nowadays firms split their financing
gap almost equally between bank loans and new bonds’ issuance. Experiments on xb will be based on this
consideration.
32Government bonds’ purchase is introduced in order to remain anchored to reality and let investing firms
have a more diversified portfolio.
33At the end of the period, hence, firms sell Government bonds to the bank.
34The fixed 4-periods bond is a tool to simplify the analysis. This is a very restrictive assumption, but
necessary to set up the model. Extensions with longer and different durations will be hopefully provided in the
future.
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each of the subsequent periods – until principal repayment – for each bond sold: iBf,tB
pv There
is no difference in the time to maturity, since all bonds must be fully repaid in t+4. At the
maturity date, then, the firm has to return the entire par value. The coupon rate is determined
by adding a premium to the benchmark (and constant) risk-free rate r. Each firm, knowing
its own classification (i.e. credit rating), will set an interest rate which accounts for the risk-
free interest rate plus a measure reflecting the riskiness associated to its financial robustness
(pr(λf,t)). Also, credit rating changes over time, depending on whether the economy is in a
good state or in economic downturns: there is evidence on the pro-cyclicality of credit rating
agencies, which tend to raise corporations’ ratings during economic upturns, while downsizing
them in periods of crisis (see Auh (2015) )35. To capture this feature, the interest rate charged
on bonds will be adjusted by a parameter λcyclet which is greater than 1 if the previous 2 periods
had been characterized by negative or nil growth, lower that 1 if in the previous two periods
the economy experienced a positive growth and equal to 1 in the intermediate cases. The rate
of return on bonds charged by the issuer will therefore simply refer to a risk premium on a
risk-free asset, where the risk premium depends on the credit rating sensitivity to business
cycles and on firms’ financial fragility:
iBf,t = r + λ
cycle
t pr(λf,t) (2.30)
When the credit market closes, firms can observe how many bonds have been purchased and
the value of external finance raised through bonds: ∆B
(c,κ)
f,t ∈ (0,∆BFf,t)36. The bonds’ market
is governed by search and matching: c-firms willing to invest can visit a fraction Zbk of k-firms,
while k-firms willing to buy bonds can visit only a fraction Zb of c-issuers. Even though Zbk = Fc
and Zb = Fk, there might be credit rationing in the financial market due to randomness: for
example, if we have only 2 k-firms willing to purchase corporate bonds, but we have 10 c-firms
looking for liquidity, it might be that some of them cannote sell their bonds because once
the two investors visit them they have already spent all the quota they planned to invest in
marketable securities. If investors do not use the entire amount τBMi,t−1 they save it back into
deposits.
Purchase of Bonds (Supply Side)
Each Investor buys an amount of bonds n¬ff,t whose value is n
B
¬f,tB
pv from the ¬f-th firm, so
that the sum of all bonds purchased from different firms gives the total amount of bonds to be
35Credit rating agencies (CRA) mainly consider 5 factors in determining the rating: (i) leverage and coverage,
(ii) scale, (iii) profitability, (iv) business profile, (v) financial policy. To simplify things to the maximum extent,
in this model a fictitious CRA sets the rating depending uniquely on financial fragility. Indeed, ”leverage and
coverage” hugely determines the final rating, as explained by Çelik, Demirtas, and Isaksson (2020). A credit
cycle feedback is, however, introduced in the model: the final interest applied on bonds will take into account
CRA tendency to relax rating accuracy in periods of economic growth, leading to higher quality ratings, while
they worsen credit ratings in poor periods (see Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013), Auh (2015) and Lobo, Paugam,




added to the current stock of bonds in period t:∑
¬f
nB¬f,tB
pv = ∆Bf,t (2.31)









Principal repayments occur in the 4th period, together with the last coupon.
2.3.5 The Public Sector
The public sector does not consume any of the goods and is not involved in the research
process: basic research and its spillover effects are, hence, missing in this economy. Government




ππf,t, and gives transfers to unem-
ployed workers according to a replacement rate, cz and the average wage rate in the economy
wt. In order to finance its public debt, when necessary, it issues bonds:
USt = cz · wt(Nw −Nt) (2.33)




A small fraction of safe bonds are purchased by liquid firms, whilst the rest is purchased by
the bank.
2.3.6 Accounting
Households’ wealth coincides with non-remunerated deposits at the bank:
Ec,t = Mc,t = Mc,t−1 + Yc,t − Cc,t (2.35)
C-firms’ balance sheet is represented by the following accounting identity:
Kphy + vrdi,tKi,t +Bi,t + Ivti,t +Mi,t = Li,t +B
κ
i,t + Ei,t (2.36)
with vrdi,t representing the book value of intangible capital; Bi,t is total financial assets (par value
of the stock of purchased bonds not yet matured); Ivti,t is stored inventories (value); Mi,t is
liquidity (i.e. deposits), which corresponds to internal funds; Li,t is firm’s total debt in the form
of bank loans, Bκi,t is debt in the form of issued bonds (held by k-firms) and Ei,t is equity (or net
worth). It is worth noting that through the purchase of k-firms’ bonds, c-firms (i) expand their
assets; (ii) increase their available internal funds if the issuer repay its debt, making additional
60
financial profits; (iii) decrease their deposits if the issuer goes bankrupt. Profits of c-firms at












with min{Yi,t, Y di,t} being the amount of consumption good actually sold, vrdi,tIri,t the depreciated
value of intangible capital actually used and ∆Ivti,t the variation of inventories. Financial prof-
its (or financial revenues37, constituted by interest payments) of c-firms are given by interests
on bonds and coupons paid by solvent k-firms (Fs):







Internal funds at time t, Mi,t are hence described as follows:
Mi,t = Mi,t−1 + (1− τDiv)πi,t + vrdi,tIri,t − pκk,tIi,t −∆Ivti,t + ∆Li,t + ∆Bκi,t





where φLLi,t is debt installment (the portion of principal to be repaid in t), r̂
L
i,tLi,t are the
interest payments on loans; pk,tIi,t is expenditure in new intangible capital good evaluated at
the current prices; and the last term in brackets is the difference between the par value of bonds
at maturity repaid by solvent borrowers in t,
∑Fs







i,t is credit from bonds purchased by k-firms.
K-firms’ balance sheet identity is instead:
Mj,t = Bj,t + Lj,t + Ej,t (2.40)
Internal funds are given by:
Mj,t = Mj,t−1 + (1− τDiv)πj,t −∆Ivtj,t + ∆Lj,t + ∆Bcj,t





Profits are again given by operating profits and financial profits:
πj,t = pj,tKj,t − (wNj,t) + πBj,t (2.41)
37there are no costs associated with the financial activity
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Finally, net worth in both cases is simply given as:
Ef,t = Ef,t−1 + (1− τDiv)πf,t (2.42)
When bankruptcy occurs investing firms register a bad debt constituted by unreceived principal
repayments and a new firm will then enter the market with a level of equity determined by the
capitalist owning the bankrupt who will use part of his financial wealth as equity for a new
entrant.
Concerning the bank, its balance sheet is composed as follows:
Rt + Lt = Mt + E
b
t (2.43)
where Rt represents the bank’s deposits as reserves; Lt is total loans extended to firms; Mt
is total deposits of firms and households and Et is the bank’s equity. The bank’s profits are




rs,tLs,t + INTt (2.44)










Different models are simulated, starting from a baseline model, whose main function is to
replicate an economy where companies can only receive bank credit. Bonds (both government
bonds and corporate bonds in firms’ balance sheets) are then introduced in the model. Results
will be presented as single simulations’ outcomes or as the mean of 15 runs of Monte Carlo
simulations over 1500 periods.Having initialized the model at the best possible scenario (i.e. at
full employment), variables are subject to huge initial temporary fluctuations and take some
time in order to stabilize. For this reason, time series will be presented from period 400 to
1500. The initialization procedure can be found in Appendix D.4.
2.4.1 Baseline Model Dynamics and Empirical Validation
Before proceeding with experiments concerning the introduction of a corporate bond market,
it is worth observing some of the macroeconomic dynamics and microeconomic implications
generated by the baseline model and assess its plausibility by comparing it with real data. As
shown in Figure 2.1 below – where log levels of real GDP, real consumption and real investment
in intangible capital are plotted (top), together with their filtered time series, to isolate cyclical
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components (bottom) – the simulated model is able to reproduce economic growth.
Figure 2.1: Log levels of real GDP, real consumption and real intangible investment and cyclical
components. Results stem from averaged 15 Monte Carlo simulations. HP filter applied in the bottom panel.
The top panel, indeed, exhibits growing real GDP (black line), sustained by real consump-
tion growth (red line) and intangible investment (yellow dashed line). By later applying the HP
filter (bottom panel), we can observe the behaviour of the three variables over business cycles:
real output, consumption and investment generally have similar turning points, even though
real consumption does not fully co-move with real GDP38. The pro-cyclicality of consumption
and investment is, however, confirmed and, intangible investment have properties similar to
those of physical capital investment in literature (see Stock and Watson (1999)): the HP fil-
tered variables’ panel, indeed, shows a greater volatility of investment as compared to output
and consumption, as reported also in Table 2.139. Business cycles characterize both growth
paths and Figure 2.2 provides some graphical help coming from single simulations to visualize
the associated interrelated effects on macro variables:
38This particular issue arose once the wage rate has been made non-uniform across sectors. One possible
explanation is that workers employed, for instance, in the capital good sector (that on average pays higher
wages than the consumption good sector), may find themselves employed in the consumption good sector in the
subsequent period if he has been fired. Such a sudden change of earned wage may impact on his personal wealth
and expectations on future income and therefore may have effects on human wealth and individual consumption.
39This is not surprising, since investment rules are the same as those of CATS model with physical capital.
One purpose is to extend the model, get rid of the assumption that forces physical capital to be an endowment
and use optimization rules to determine the level of investment in physical capital and the level of investment
in intangible capital, given the CES function. A proper measure of intangible investment is still missing.
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Figure 2.2: Selected macroeconomic time series and Lorenz curve. Baseline model’s time series taken
from individual representative simulations in order to keep business cycles properties.
Growth is endogenously generated through increased productivity of intangibles: the cor-
relation between jumps of the technological frontier and raising GDP can easily be observed
(e.g. right after t=1000). The technological frontier, by increasing labor productivity of both
capital producers and consumption good producers, opens the way to a series of effects on
either the demand side either the supply side of the economy. In the k-sector, successful inno-
vation processes end with increased productivity of workers and higher learning. The latter,
will positively impact on next period ability of accessing innovation, perhaps counterbalancing
lower investment in R&D due to possible lower profits. Sectorial labor productivity growth de-
termines sectorial wage rates, which thereby cannot grow much faster than labor productivity.
This causes dropping unit labor costs for k-firms and more stable unit labor costs for c-firms,
due to the fact that consumption good firms own a stock of intangible capital whose average
productivity averages out with the unit productivity of the endowed physical stock of capital. It
is this overall measure that determines c-firms’ workers labor productivity, whose growth trend,
subsequently, is lower with respect of that of k-sectors’ one. Overall, periods of drastic inno-
vations (as after period t= 1000 in the figures) boosts average labor productivity consistently.
When the pace of innovation decelerateslower wages translate into lower aggregate demand.
Prolonged periods of productivity stagnation can decrease the learning parameter and hence
this makes R&D efforts little prolific, by limiting access to innovation and enhancing barriers
to entry. A low speed of high quality produced intangibles, also decreases the speed of con-
sumption good quantities (because of lower labor productivity that in turn make wages to grow
very slowly). Since innovation causes a jump in wages, a sudden increase in average costs of
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production may also cause excessive firing in the very short-run in case the firm is over indebted
and especially if the innovation is in the hand of few consumption-good producers resulting in
higher unemployment, depressing demand and therefore production (this dynamics can be seen
for example before t=600, where there has been some subsequent frontier improvements after
a long period of stagnation). As c-firms invest in the last innovative intangible, however, labor
requirements readjust and demand increases. Real investment units are volatile but around a
trend, while real investment calculated as units of investment multiplied by prices at the base
period (not shown in Figure 2.2, but intuitable from 2.1) is increasing because of rising prices
of the capital good (despite the drop in unit labor costs average costs tend to grow because
of interests payments and k-firms cannot set their price below their average cost). Given the
households’ separation among workers and capitalists (and the differences in their incomes),
some level of wealth inequality was expected.
Finally, Table 2.1 reports standard deviation values and the first lag autocorrelation of
selected variables stemming from Monte Carlo parallel simulations: GDP, consumption, un-
employment rate, inflation and intangible investment. Figures reporting autocorrelations and
cross correlations of simulated time series and real observed time series can be found in the
Appendix.
Table 2.1: Cyclical components’ standard deviation and first lag autocorrelation of selected
variables of the baseline simulated model (average of 15 Monte Carlo runs).
standard deviation first lag autocorrelation
GDP 0.021194 0.59217
consumption 0.01225 0.31283
intangible investment 0.15746 0.11404
unemployment rate 0.056633 0.59691
inflation 0.016067 0.030516
2.4.2 Experiments Including Corporate Bonds’ Purchase
A number of different experiments are run on the baseline model in order to investigate three
main features: the effect of bonds on (i) economic growth and key macroeconomic variables,
(ii) financial stability of the entire system and (iii) liquidity of firms. Experiments results
are the average of 15 Monte Carlo simulations run over 1500 periods (first 400 periods not
reported in figures). Parameters are set arbitrarily: investors set a fraction τB of liquidity
to be devoted to financial assets; the financial portfolio will be composed of risky bonds and
riskless bonds according to the parameter xGov=0.5 and issuers can cover up to xb=0.5 (for
c-firms) and xb = 0.35 (k-firms) of their financing gap with new bonds’ issuance. Only the
parameter τB will be changed during experiments, keeping the others at their original value.
In Experiment 1, all firms set the same fraction of liquidity to be devoted to bonds’ purchase;
in Experiment 2, all firms set the same fraction of liquidity to be devoted to bonds’ purchase
but the set of parameters is relatively higher with respect to Experiment 1; in Experiment 3
firms set different fractions of liquidity to be devoted to bonds’ purchase: k-firms set τB =
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(0.0001; 0.001; 0.01), whilst c-firms set τB = (0.00025; 0.0025; 0.025); finally in Experiment 4
replicates Experiment 3 but with a higher gap: k-firms set τB = (0.0001; 0.001; 0.01), whilst
c-firms set τB = (0.0005; 0.005; 0.05). Experiments are summarized in Table 2.2, while the
significance of the experiments Table 8 in Appendix G.7:
Table 2.2: Experiments. Liquidity fraction parameter’s values according to the different experiments.
Liquidity fraction
Experiment 1 τB = {0.0001; 0.001; 0.01}.
Experiment 2 τB = {0.0005; 0.005; 0.05}.
Experiment 3 τB = {(0.0001, 0.00025); (0.001, 0.0025); (0.01, 0.025)}
Experiment 4 τB = {(0.0001, 0.0005); (0.001, 0.005); (0.01, 0.05)}
When Firms Buy corporate Bonds: Experiments’ Outcomes
The first experiment consists of setting three different low liquidity fraction values and run
15 Monte Carlo simulations for each low value of τB: the light blue trends in the top panels
of Figure2.3 averages out the Monte Carlo simulations for τB = 0.0001; the blue trends for τB
= 0.001 and the dark blue ones for τB = 0.01. Right after, we consider the case in which a
higher set of liquidity fraction is employed in the decision process (Experiment 2) and we can
observe the averages of 15 Monte Carlo simulations in the bottom panels of Figure2.3: the light
green trends are the outcome of τB = 0.0005; the green line of τB = 0.005 and the dark green
one of τB = 0.05. An important assumption of these two first experiments is that all firms
in all sectors use the same liquidity fraction. Experiment 1 suggests that firms’ engagement
in the lending activity through bonds’ purchasing is detrimental to growth (top left panel): in
all cases, indeed, GDP grows much less than in the baseline scenario (where credit consists of
bank loans only).
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Figure 2.3: GDP, technological frontier of the economy and unemployment rate when all firms
set the same fraction τB = (0.0001, 0.001, 0.01), top panels, and then increase the fraction τB =
(0.0005, 0.005, 0.05), bottom panel.
The left bottom panel, however, tells another story: it seems that as long as the fraction
of liquidity remains below a certain threshold, the negative impact on growth persists; as
the threshold is overcome, instead, the result is strongly reversed and corporations’ financial
portfolios foster economic growth and technological progress. This overall picture might be
explained through the finance-growth nexus, attributing the positive effect on growth to the
higher availability of credit. If all companies, indeed, set their liquidity quota according to
a very small fraction, there might be a credit contraction due to the fact that, by model
construction, firms ask for credit bank only to cover the 50-65% of their financing gap, so
there might be credit rationing due to insufficient disposable money on financial markets.
As corporations decide to increase their liquidity quota to be dedicated to financial assets,
the credit expansion will fuel R&D, investment and therefore technological progress. Higher
credit availability, indeed, stimulates capital investment, rising demand for intangibles and
increasing R&D efforts of k-firms, which from the one hand can take advantage of increased
profits due to financial profits, and on the other, will increase their indebtedness if necessary.
Technological frontier, indeed, moves faster in any simulation of experiment 2, together with
c-firms’ profitability, wages and aggregate demand which stimulates further production of the
consumption good and intangibles’ demand/investment. K-innovator, cannot relax and enjoy
the appropriability effect as in the baseline model because the economy is less stagnant, demand
for intagibles is higher and this pushes k-firms to try and escape competition, also thanks to
the additional profits coming from financial markets, which increase the quota of profits to be
invested in R&D.
The impressive increase of GDP and the technological frontier, however, has some draw-
backs. Figure2.4, indeed, shows that the bankruptcy rate increases up to 2% when it comes to
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τB = 0.05 (it is the only case: as we can observe in Appendix H.8, that reports bankruptcy
rates for all experiments) together with the share of Ponzi units in the economy (whilst both
the hedge share and the speculative share converge to the baseline scenario), signalling that
excessive amounts of liquidity fractions going to bonds may generate some financial instabil-
ity. The mechanism is once again endogenous: the increased external financing availability,
which pushes innovation and growth, also pushes high demand because of increasing wages
(see Figure13 in the Appendix) and, therefore, desired production of firms. This causes a rush
to bank loans and further bonds’ issuance (since they might have used some liquidity to hold
c-bonds and) and a decrease in profitability, due to higher costs of debt. Firms’ liquidity begins
to suffer but we do not observe any significant shift toward more speculative positions in the
economy that leads to a jump in unpaid interests to banks -which will be less prone to concede
credit and increase interest rates- and debt renegotiations. The only interesting consequence
refers to increased leverage and interests payments that bring a certain number of firms to a
Ponzi position and to default.
Figure 2.4: Bankruptcy rate and and composition of the economy according to financial fragility
for τB = 0.01 (blue trends) and for τB = 0.05 (red trends)
Let us finally consider Experiment 3 and 4. The crucial difference with respect to the
two previous experiments, is that companies invest different fractions of liquidity into bonds.
to simplify things to the maximum extent, we assumed that all firms belonging to the same
sector set the same liquidity fraction τB, but this fraction must be different among the two
sectors. Suppose then that k-firms set τB = {0.0001; 0.001; 0.01}, whilst c-firms set τB =
{0.00025; 0.0025; 0.025} (Experiment 3) in a first moment and then that c-firms further increase
their τB = {0.0005; 0.005; 0.05} (Experiment 4). The main trends stemming from the averaging
out of the 15 Monte Carlo simulations are reported in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: GDP, technological frontier of the economy and unemployment rate when k-firms set
a fraction τB = (0.0001, 0.001, 0.01), top panels, and c-firms set a higher fraction τB = (0.0005,
0.005, 0.05), bottom panel.
In both experiments, we do not observe dramatic departures from the baseline scenario, as in
the second experiment simulation with τB = 0.05. Rather, the introduction of an element of
heterogeneity among firms in financial investment decisions does not seem to foster technical
change –with only one exception. Furthermore, the situation even worsens if we significantly
increase this gap: in the bottom left panel of Figure2.5 we can observe, indeed, that GDP
never overperforms the baseline model, whilst it did when the gap was smaller (top left panel,
dark purple time series). Although this result is far from being conclusive and needs further
investigation, it is worth trying to figure out what might be the possible mechanisms behind.
Why should heterogeneous behaviour in corporations’ financial investment decisions – including
corporate risky bonds – decelerate growth? Partly because there is again some a priori credit
rationing mechanism, at least with respect to the experiment 2 case (where the mismatch has
been very low from the very beginning). k-firms invest a lower quota of their liquidity in c-
firms’ bonds and the amount provided by k-firms might not be enough. However, there is no
such difference in credit mismatch between the baseline scenario and the experiment 4 scenario
that can that can fully justify the negative impact on growth. Another part of the story, may
be explained by the emergence of a trade-off mechanism between financial investment and c-
firms’ investment: by non homogenously increasing the fraction of liquidity going to bonds in
the economy, and specifically, augmenting the c-firms’ quotas, c-firms will have less available
deposits for intangibles’ investments; c-firms’ demand for intangibles will decrease and so does
desired production – and therefore production – of k-firms. It follows that less profits for k-
firms translate into lower engagement in R&D (and thus less technological progress and lower
growth). Summing up, although at the beginning k-firms will benefit from higher available
credit thanks to higher liquidity quotas of c-firms, the trade-off effect eventually leads to lower
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innovation.
A final comment concerns employment: in the vast majority of experiments’ simulations
the unemployment rate is substantially higher – reaching the 15% in some cases, and however
above the 10% – with respect to that of the baseline scenario. This is particularly true for
very low levels of τB. It is not surprising in light of the previous considerations: when k-firms
stop performing or perform lower R&D, they fire workers unless they increase production. But
if intangibles demand is low, desired production will be low as well. Lower innovation also
translates into lower wages (as shown in Figure13 in the Appendix), which further depress
aggregate demand and desired production of c-firms. In any of the experiment, however, de-
spite the negative impact that the purchase of bonds have on wages and unemployment, the
latter never follows an explosive path, stabilizing itself around a trend. Finally, in this model
inequality does not worsens significantly throughout the various experiments, despite a higher
financialization of the economy. This might seem at odds with the literature on financialization,
but the present model is too simple from the point of view of shareholders’ heterogeneity and
cannot capture all related aspects. Inequality here can increase only if firms succeed in making
huge financial profits, thus increasing capitalists’ income: the Gini index slighlty increases in
the experiments involving higher levels of τB; nevertheless, the change is quite unnoticeable
and this is perhaps due to the fact that financial profits cannot compensate for ”profit losses”
due to low demand and stagnant growth.
Discussion on Liquidity
Some single simulations has been extrapolated and are here presented in order to visualize
the effects of innovation on firms’ liquidity. The endogenous Schumpeterian mechanism driving
R&D efforts and, consequently, learning and the innovation process is expected to favour the
accumulation of innovators’ deposits, as shown in Figure2.6:
Figure 2.6: Liquidity of firms, baseline model. Firms’ liquidity in c-sector (left) and k-sector (right),
single simulation of the baseline model.
In both sectors, some firms succeed in accumulating very high levels of liquidity. Consider for
instance the green curve in the c-sector continuously above the others from about t=800 on: it
became the most innovative consumption-good producer between t = 625-687, and even though
another c-firm takes over around t = 700, intangibles’ properties, by lowering unit labor costs
and expanding the platform of potential buyers, ensures it the highest levels of liquidity for a
long time before the decline. In the k-sector, instead, the purple top line corresponds exactly
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to the last innovator. It has the biggest share of the market – which explains those levels of
liquidity – and a price below the average price, but extremely low unit labor costs which allow
it to set the highest mark-up among k-firms (0.0717; the second highest mark-up is 0.0595).
The imitator, however, is right behind (orange line) and already cought up, having reached
the frontier: it gained a similar fraction of market share and charged a similar price. Its R&D
effort almost equals the one of the last innovator, which is trying to engage in drastic R&D
to escape competition. The high learning parameter of the follower, and its high liquidity and
their neck-and-neckness do not leave room for the appropriability effect to the last innovator.
However, its mark-up is of 0.0107 only, confirming that the model is able to generate monopoly
rents for firms that succeed in innovating.
What happens when bonds are introduced? Let us consider only a selection of τB parame-
ter’s values to fix the main points.
Figure 2.7: Liquidity of firms, Experiment 1, with τB = 0.001. Firms’ liquidity in c-sector (left) and
k-sector (right), single simulation of the baseline model.
Two observations jump to the eye: first, firms in the k-sector can accumulate higher deposits
with respect to those operating in the c-sector and second, c-firms take a very long time to
begin accumulating significant liquidity. This is in line with the rationing mechanism arising
with low levels of financial investment quotas to be invested in bonds. In the k-sector instead
k-innovator remains the same for the entire period (yellow line) but succeeded in becoming the
mostly highly liquid firm only after t=1300. This time the innovator charges a price well above
the mean and has a low market share. However, given the extremely high mark-ups (1.6700)
and financial profits, it can continue sustaining high levels of liquidity. The R&D effort of
the last innovator is not the highest one and also the learning parameter is not particularly
relevant with respect to incumbents, however, it will still have higher probabilities of accessing
innovation simply because of its high profits, also supported by high quantities of corporate
bonds in its portfolio.
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Figure 2.8: Liquidity of firms, Experiment 2, with τB = 0.005. Firms’ liquidity in c-sector (left) and
k-sector (right), single simulation of the baseline model.
Once again the effects of being the c-firm with the greatest intangibles are long-lasting. The
green line corresponds to the c-innovator from period t = 794 to t = 856, which charges a price
around the mean and has no abnormal financial investment. The same is true for the k-sector:
last innovator does not correspond to the one with the greatest liquidity, which is instead the
previous innovator (yellow curve): despite a new innovation occurred in t = 1256, the previous
innovator remains the most rich k-firm also thanks to its great amount of financial assets. It
actually put in place a significative amount of R&D effort in the end, however, its learning
parameter is around the mean signalling that it has not innovated a lot in the previous period.
This has improbably happened because it did not have access to the innovation process (high
profits imply higher probability of accessing innovation), but rather because of previous low
R&D effort.
Overall innovation can increase liquidity and even create some concentration of liquidity for
periods of time. If this is evident in the baseline scenario, it is less evident in the selected two
experiments. In the c-sector, the accumulation of innovative intangible capital, can enhance c-
firms’ liquidity, also for many periods after a new c-firm takes over with more innovative capital
and this situations remains almost unchanged when corporate bonds enter the model. In the
k-sector, instead, things are different: innovation can increase liquidity through higher sales
(due to higher probabilities of being visited) but when firms start purchasing bonds, liquidity
is increased also through financial profits, which in some cases sustain high levels of liquidity
even though the firm is no more on the frontier, while in the baseline scenario it appears that
k-firms employ some more efforts to keep escaping competition. The introduction of bonds,
shifts more towards an appropriability effect, which not always leads to success but that can
however sustain some periods of concentrated liquidity.
2.5 Conclusions
The model stemming from this chapter is an attempt to formalize in a unique agent-based
setting, innovation and financial frictions when firms behave as credit suppliers. The two main
novelties that this model introduces are related to (i) the creation of a variable for capital
that includes both physical capital (treated as an endowment) and intangible capital (mainly
representing the IT sector, i.e. artificial intelligence, softwares, big data etc – so that specific
advertising properties can be attached); and (ii) the purchase of corporate bonds by other cor-
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porations with excess liquidity. This credit channel has been poorly investigated but deserves
some attention since it is an increasing financialization phenomenon. The complexity of the
model forced to make very restrictive assumptions, such as the absence of a secondary mar-
ket that makes firms that invest in corporate bonds holding them until maturity (it follows
that capital gains are excluded from the analysis) and the lack of an endogenous mechanism
determining companies’ liquidity fraction to be allocated to bonds. Different experiments are
therefore presented using different exogenous parameters: in almost all experiments but one,
corporations’ bonds acquisitions hamper growth – mostly because of excessive initial credit ra-
tioning and for lower funds available to carry investments –, increasing the unemployment rate
and dampening technological progress. However, this conclusion seems to hold until a certain
threshold, whereupon the additional credit availability stimulates the economy, raising wages,
aggregate consumption, production and investment as well as R&D, which accelerates the pace
of innovation. Higher access to credit, however, and the interrelated balance sheets of firms also
increases the bankruptcy rate. Finally, when the bonds’ channel opens, the rules of the game
about firms’ liquidity appear to somehow change, so that we can easily observe corporations no




The current dissertation tried to address two main phenomena shaping our economy: (i)
the digitalization of the economy, mainly proxied by R&D and intangibles and (ii) financial-
ization, with particular attention to corporations’ financial investments. A special focus on
their relationship with market power follows the entire analysis. The first chapter provides an
empirical investigation of the determinants of corporations’ Surplus Wealth and their capital
investment decisions. Overall, Surplus Wealth is affected by financialization and, in particular,
by shareholders’ value orientation, that almost doubles its effect on monopoly Surplus Wealth.
Financial investment, instead appear to be beneficial to both tangible capital investment and
intangible capital investment for the overall economy; however, current financial investment ac-
tually seem to cause a trade-off effect with capital investment decision making. These features
do not stem from GMM regressions on monopolists operating in the IT sector, which instead are
not affected at all by financial investment concerning physical capital expenditure, whilst R&D
and advertising expenditure appears to be positively affected by financial profits, current finan-
cial assets and past financial investment. The second chapter develops, instead, a theoretical
agent-based model that brings together two models of the macro ABMs tradition: the CATS
model – that focuses on financial frictions – and the K+S model – which unfolds endogenous
growth in a Schumpeterian framework. Intangible capital is introduced in the production func-
tion and is assumed to be the channel through which innovation, pursued by means of R&D,
propagates. Specific advertising properties of intangibles are able to generate accumulation of
liquidity, which can even last more when financial investments begin to play a role. From a
macroeconomic perspective, companies’ purchase of corporate bonds is not beneficial to growth,
except when the liquidity fraction parameter overcomes a given threshold: below, there is a
credit rationing mechanism due to excess demand for credit; above the finance-growth nexus
operates – fostering technological progress – but at the expense of higher bankruptcies. Further,
when we introduce some heterogeneity concerning firms’ liquidity parameter to be devolved to
financial assets, the economy performs worse with respect to the baseline scenario (without
market for bonds), due to the emergence of the trade-off effect between capital investment and
financial investment. The present analysis is far from being conclusive: the empirical study
could be further improved and the theoretical model needs some more realistic extensions, such
as corporate bonds’ trading and an endogenous decision process to determine how much a firm
wants to invest in financial assets. Nevertheless, it can provide some insights on two emergent




A.1 - Summary Statistics
Table 3: Summary statistics
Representative sample Q2 sample P95 sample
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs.
ov: 1576.690 N=57203 ov: 17791.620 N=73431 ov: 51628.040 N=7325
SW 369.95 btw: 895.701 n=2275 3118.286 btw: 7851.728 n=6440 23672.86 btw: 21989.420 n= 857
wth: 1262.109 T-bar=25.34 wth: 13465 T-bar= 11.40 wth: 40567 T-bar=8.55
ov: 2067.086 N=57203 ov: 15544.160 N=73431 ov: 41561.16 N=7325
SALES 917.10 btw: 1389.953 n=2257 3399.650 btw: 9932.552 n=6440 19731.64 btw: 25350.980 857
wth: 1364.885 T-bar=25.34 wth: 8806.927 T-bar= 11.402 wth: 24562.360 T-bar=8.55
ov: 0.557 N=57202 ov: 15.577 N=73431 ov: 0.230 N=7325
LEV 0.514 btw: 0.266 n=2257 0.633 btw: 15.444 n=6440 0.529 btw: 0.258 n= 857
wth: 0.501 T-bar=25.34 wth: 12.458 T-bar=11.40 wth: 0.127 T-bar=8.547
ov: 1.955 N=57202 ov: 19.656 N= 73431 ov: 4.260 N=7325
TobinQ 1.774 btw: 1.207 n=2257 2.858 btw: 35.150 n=6440 3.062 btw: 5.461 n=857
wth: 1.604 T-bar=25.34 wth: 13.483 T-bar=11.40 wth: 3.397 T-bar=8.55
ov: 0.005 N=55769 ov: 0.021 N=71054 ov: 0.038 N=7135
Lprod 0.003 btw: 0.003 n=2256 0.004 btw: 0.031 n= 6348 0.006 btw: 0.022 n= 836
wth: 0.003 T-bar=24.72 wth: 0.015 T-bar=11.19 wth: 0.032 T-bar=8.53
ov: 50.147 N=57203 ov: 528.239 N=73431 ov: 1495.453 N=7325
DIV 13.032 btw: 23.989 n= 2257 90.694 ov: 295.629 n=6440 666.942 btw: 782.683 n= 857
wth: 42.496 T-bar=25.34 wth: 353.011 T-bar=11.40 wth: 1065.023 T-bar=8.55
ov: 91.214 N=57203 ov: 758.699 N= 73431 ov: 2297.529 N=7325
BUY BACK 17.651 btw: 34.498 n=2257 98.168 btw: 297.388 n=6440 669.798 btw: 843.999 n= 857
wth: 83.098 T-bar=25.34 wth; 649.316 T-bar=11.40 wth: 1958.553 T-bar=8.55
ov: 372.628 N=57203 ov: 1977.326 N=73431 ov: 4709.921 N=7325
MKT FINANCE 88.927 btw: 163.507 n=2257 321.101 btw: 1592.801 n=6440 1478.238 btw: 3878.42 n=857
wth: 332.296 T-bar=25.34 wth: 1384.409 T-bar= 11.40 wth: 3324.28 T-bar=8.55
ov: 7.790 N=57203 ov: 64.668 N=73431 ov: 182.916 N=7325
πfin 2.271 btw: 4.723 n=2257 9.899 btw: 44.743 n= 6440 66.752 btw: 124.152 n=857
wth: 6.048 T-bar=25.34 wth: 42.278 T-bar=11.40 wth: 118.722 T-bar=8.55
ov: 112.573 N=57203 ov: 1178.485 N=73416 ov: 3220.162 N=7322
Iκ 43.672 btw: 75.881 n=2257 209.917 btw: 832.888 n=6440 1263.051 btw: 2144.254 n=857
wth: 78.924 T-bar=25.34 wth: 683.845 T-bar= 11.40 wth: 1926.458 T-bar=8.54
ov: 82.636 N=57203 ov: 788.480 N=73416 ov: 2180.309 N=7322
I intan 28.184 btw: 57.699 n= 2257 145.901 btw: 432.219 n= 6440 1015.200 btw: 1100.030 n=857
wth: 55.561 T-bar=25.34 wth: 493.202 T-bar=11.40 wth = 1486.84 T-bar= 8.54
ov: 581.457 N=57167 ov: 3381.307 N=73368 ov: 8530.568 N=7314
DEBT 194.78 btw: 330.943 n=2257 744.521 btw: 2208.973 n=6440 3918.433 btw: 5330.001 n=857
wth: 454.646 T-bar=25.33 wth: 2122.225 T-bar=11.39 wth: 5791.962 T-bar=8.53
ov: 136.843 N=57203 ov: 1240.498 N= 73416 ov: 3531.024 N=7322
PAY fin 47.045 btw: 68.471 n=2257 237.152 btw: 613.284 n=6440 1581.734 btw: 1606.581 n=857
wth: 113.630 T-bar=25.34 wth: 915.741 T-bar=11.40 wth: 2757.553 T-bar=8.54
ov: 177.832 N=57203 ov: 4248.884 N=73416 ov: 12575.400 N= 7322
RED 49.504 btw: 96.468 n=2257 481.775 btw: 2183.848 n=6440 3574.21 btw: 5920.382 n=857
wth: 143.838 T-bar=25.34 wth: 2949.057 T-bar=11.40 wth: 8861.973 T-bar=8.54
ov: 69.853 N=57203 ov: 1649.065 N=73416 ov: 5028.975 N=7322
s.t. Ifin 18.551 btw: 40.439 n=2257 156.242 btw: 791.508 n=6440 1130.105 btw: 2304.784 n=857
wth: 57.834 T-bar=25.34 wth: 1212.242 T-bar=11.40 wth: 3712.95 T-bar=8.54
Variables are already adjusted for missing values. Variables used in the Surplus Wealth analysis
are then standardized (variables are reported with an ”s” at the beginning). Variables used in
the investment analysis are then deflated by GDP price index 2015 base year -source FRED-
(except for capx which is deflated by Investment goods price index), further adjusted by total
assets to correct for heteroskedasticity and turned into logs (variables are reported in lower case
letters).






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.3 - Estimated Mark-Ups
In this section of the Appendix we try to apply the mark-up estimation procedure described
De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2020b) with the original insights of Olley and Pakes (1992)
to calculate firm level mark-ups and extend the analysis on Surplus Wealth. Following the
above mentioned literature, the mark-up is calculated as the ratio of revenues (SALES) over







In order to estimate Zi,t, which is unobservable, we run a two-stage regression with bootstrapped
standard errors (but with investment – and not intermediate inputs – as a proxy for productivity
following the original intuition of Olley and Pakes (1992)). To be in line with the analysis,
outliers belonging to the 1st and 99th percentile of the mark-up distribution have been dropped.
Figure 9 plots the average estimated mark-up from 1970 to 2018. As one can notice, although
the trend is increasing (at least until 2010), coherently with evidence provided by De Loecker,
Eeckhout, and Unger (2020a), its volatility does not replicate the cited work40 and for this
reason the analysis including mark-ups has been handled in this section of the Appendix.
Furthermore, the correlation between markupt and SWt is irrelevant: 11.7%, which is puzzling
if we refer to standard theory, since we expect the two to be highly correlated. The difference in
estimated mark-ups can be due to three main features: (i) our estimate may be wrong because
we used capital expenditure and intangible expenditure as a proxy for productivity (mainly
following Olley and Pakes (1992) intuitions instead of intermediate inputs) and in estimating
output elasticity; (ii) we tried to estimate output elasticity for each individual firm and not
by sector; (iii) mark-ups alone are no more able to capture monopolistic power. However, as
a work in progress exercise and assuming that our mark-up estimates are reliable, we consider
mark-ups among the control variables (as the ability of firms to increase prices and/or decrease
variable costs even though they do not have significantly high levels of market power) and run
the same regressions as those in Section 1.5. Results are shown in Table 7. Results basically
replicate those in Table 1.3 and the inclusion of our mark-up estimate slightly improves the R2
between, being its coefficient highly significant and positive (ranging from 2.73% to 5.10%) in
all specifications.
40See Figure 1 pag. 9, De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2020a).
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Figure 9: Average estimated mark-up of US corporations. 1970-2018.
Table 7: Fixed-effect regression of Surplus Wealth on sales, leverage, Tobin’s q, labor productiv-
ity, mark-up, acquisitions, intangibles’ proxy, dividends paid, buybacks, newly issued stocks and
bonds and financial profits. Period 1970-2018. Representative sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt sSWt
sSALESt 0.348*** 0.200*** 0.347*** 0.181*** 0.327*** 0.332*** 0.169*** 0.0818
(0.0731) (0.0686) (0.0731) (0.0592) (0.0729) (0.0729) (0.0595) (0.0580)
sLEVt -0.0309** -0.0348*** -0.0306** -0.0350*** -0.0335** -0.0305** -0.0350*** -0.0369***
(0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0122) (0.0122)
sTobinQt 0.181*** 0.187*** 0.181*** 0.171*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.172*** 0.177***
(0.0233) (0.0242) (0.0233) (0.0221) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0222) (0.0230)
sLprodt -0.00107 -0.00479 -0.000558 0.000556 -0.000560 -0.00113 0.000976 -0.00236
(0.00616) (0.00469) (0.00624) (0.00586) (0.00615) (0.00614) (0.00596) (0.00449)
sMARKUPt 0.0510*** 0.0343*** 0.0510*** 0.0393*** 0.0500*** 0.0497*** 0.0385*** 0.0273***
(0.0134) (0.00951) (0.0134) (0.0113) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0112) (0.00862)
sI intant 0.321*** 0.251***
(0.0635) (0.0592)
sACQt 0.0350** 0.0244* 0.0170
(0.0159) (0.0132) (0.0128)
sDIVt 0.231*** 0.228*** 0.207***
(0.0564) (0.0560) (0.0523)
sBUY BACKt 0.174*** 0.171*** 0.158***
(0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0301)
sMKT FINANCEt 0.0568** 0.0133 -0.00919
(0.0230) (0.0221) (0.0241)
sπfint 0.0654*** 0.0356 0.0122
(0.0236) (0.0218) (0.0187)
N. obs. 54659 54659 54659 54659 54659 54659 54659 54659
N. firms 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203
R2within 0.214 0.266 0.214 0.309 0.217 0.217 0.310 0.340
R2between 0.257 0.393 0.260 0.453 0.263 0.271 0.457 0.520
R2overall 0.229 0.316 0.230 0.374 0.234 0.236 0.376 0.417
Time fixed eff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
D.4 Model Initialization
The model is initialized at the best possible scenario in the steady state (s.s. hereafter):
(i) there is perfect competition in both consumption-good market and capital-good market;
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(ii) the economy is characterized by full employment and (iii) firms can self-finance themselves
with no need of external financing. The desired rate of unemployment at s.s., gssUn, is set to be
equal to zero; it follows that all workers are employed to produce the homogeneous consump-
tion good and intangible capital. GDP is easily calculated by multiplying the total number of
employed workers by labor productivity. To get individual firms’ output, total GDP is divided
by the number of firms in the economy: following Caiani, Godin, Caverzasi, Gallegati, Kinsella,
and Stiglitz (2016) initialization procedure, it is assumed that k-firms are 1/5 of c-firms and
consequently production in the k-sector is 1/5 of production in the c-sector as well as employees.
K-sector
By dividing the wage rate by labor productivity, one can get to the unit cost, which is exactly
equal to the price charged by k-firms (i.e. in s.s. the murk-up charged by k-firms is nil). Liq-
uidity (i.e. k-firms’ deposits) is a fraction of wages paid to workers. Proceeding as in Caiani,
Godin, Caverzasi, Gallegati, Kinsella, and Stiglitz (2016), given the real stationary state, k-
firms’ production exactly coincides with the quantity of worn out intangible capital of c-firms
that need to be replaced. All output that is produced is assumed to be sold (supply=demand),
therefore initial inventories are set to zero. Assume also for simplicity that in s.s. every firm
has no need of external financing, so that loans=0. Profits, being revenues minus wages end up
to be nil as well (which is in line with the assumption of perfect competition). No dividends
nor taxes are paid as a consequence.
C-sector
The nominal value of intangible capital is calculated by multiplying the quantity of intangible
capital by the price of intangible capital and, together with the endowed physical capital and
initial liquidity, constitutes c-firms’ equity. Again, inventories, profits, taxes, dividends and
loans are zero.
Rest of the economy
Workers’ wealth is obtained by multiplying the wage rate by the total number of workers41,
while capitalists’ wealth is zero. Because the economy is in a stationary state, real consumption
corresponds to c-sector’s total output.
41Workers also pay taxes on their income, raised by the Government.
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E.5 - Parameters Value
Parameters Description Values
Fc n. of c-firms 100
Fk n. of k-firms 20
W n. of workers 1800
Zc n. of interactions in consumption good market 2
Zk n. of interactions in capital good market 2
Ze n. of job applications 5
Zb, Zbk n. of interactions in the bonds’ market 20,100
ξhw memory parameter human wealth 0.76
χ fraction of wealth going to consumption 0.05
νY c-firms’ quantity adjustment parameter 0.9
νK k-firms’ quantity adjustment parameter 0.9




) k-firms’ folded normal distribution parameters (0,0.01)




) c-firms’ folded normal distribution parameters (0,0.01)
aκf,0 initial k-firms’ labor productivity 0.66667
Aj,0 initial entailed capital productivity 0.33333
φL fraction of bank debt principal repayment 0.05
r general refinancing rate 0.015
τDiv firms’ dividends’ payout ratio 0.3
δ intangible capital depreciation 0.0667
ξκ memory parameter in the capital utilization rate 0.5
γ probability of investing in new intangible capital 0.5
Bpv bonds’ par value 1
z̄ R&D effort 0.03
ε fraction of R&D devoted to innovation 0.5
ζ1j,0 initial learning, innovation 0.45
ζ2j,0 initial learning, imitation 0.45
(αx, βx Beta distribution parameter (3,3)
[x, x̄] support interval (Beta distribution) for capital productivity [-0.15,0.15]
[x, x̄] support interval (Beta distribution) for labor productivity [-0.15,0.15]
bphy, brd capital factors distribution 0.5, 0.5
σ elasticity of substitution 0.5
µL bank’s mark-up 1.2
tw tax rate on wage income 0.04
tπ tax rate on firms’ and bank’s profits 0.04
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F.6 - Autocorrelations and Lagged Correlations of Se-
lected Variables
Figure 10: Autocorrelations. Artificial time series of 15 Monte Carlo simulations, averaged out (left) and
observed time series (right).
Figure 11: Lagged correlations. Artificial time series 15 Monte Carlo simulations, averaged out (left) and
observed time series (right).
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G.7 - Significance of the Experiments: Two Sample Test
Table 8: Two sample tests to test the significance of selected variables (real GDP, unemployment
rate, technological frontier and bankruptcy rate) and experiments. Averages over 15 Monte
Carlo runs are displayed, as well as standard deviations (in parenthesis). The star besides the
average value indicates the significance at 5%. Experiments involving τB = 0.0001 and τB = 0.0005 are
not reported but display the same significance as those with τB = 0.001 and τB = 0.005.
GDP Unempl. rate Tech. frontier Bankr. rate
Baseline model 2643.5568 0.0975 0.7511 0.0060
(331.1599) (0.0038) (0.1436) (0.0014)
Exp.1: τB = 0.001 2423.9808* 0.1086* 0.6891 0.0058
(199.4849) (0.0094) (0.1117) (0.0013)
Exp.1: τB = 0.01 2467.9243 0.0990 0.6897 0.0064
(182.5943) (0.0047) (0.0968) (0.0013)
Exp.2: τB = 0.005 2558.3460 0.1060* 0.7625 0.0070
(240.7114) (0.0084) (0.1505) (0.0014)
Exp.2: τB = 0.05 2962.2028* 0.1025* 0.9421* 0.0084*
(440.5952) (0.0081) (0.2376) (0.0025)
Exp.3: τB = (0.001; 0.0025) 2413.4905* 0.1083* 0.6864 0.0060
(141.3988) (0.0080) (0.0847) (0.0013)
Exp.3: τB = (0.01; 0.025) 2651.7316 0.1031* 0.7936 0.0078*
(453.7276) (0.0083) (0.2108) (0.0020)
Exp.4: τB = (0.001; 0.005) 2362.5295* 0.1038* 0.6730 0.0057
(194.028) (0.0097) (0.1281) (0.0018)
Exp.4: τB = (0.01; 0.05) 2556.7630 0.1011 0.7400 0.0073*
(270.5399) (0.0057) (0.1568) (0.0020)
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Figure 12: Bankruptcy rate and financial position of the economy. All experiments.
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I.9 - Wages and Inequality
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 13: Wages and Gini index. All experiments.
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